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We propose an approach to measuring the misallocation of production in a market that
compares actual industry cost curves to undistorted (counterfactual) supply curves. As
compared to traditional, TFPR-based, misallocation measures, this approach leverages cost
data, such that results are readily mapped to welfare metrics. As an application, we analyze
global crude oil extraction and quantify the extent of misallocation therein, together with
the proportion attributable to market power. From 1970 to 2014, we find substantial misal-
location, in the order of 744 billion USD, 14.1 percent to 21.9 percent of which is attributable
to market power.
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1 Misallocation and productive inefficiency
The aggregate impact of the misallocation of production across an economy’s productive units
has attracted considerable attention in recent years.1 This production misallocation, and the re-
sulting welfare loss, occurs through more production being allocated to less productive (higher-
cost) units of production, and less production to the most efficient production units in the
economy. Much of the extant literature on misallocation focuses on measuring misallocation
by examining dispersion in establishment-level revenue total factor productivity (TFPR) within
industries or entire economies.
Restuccia and Rogerson (2013, 2017) decompose this literature into the direct approach, which
looks at evidence of misallocation arising from specific observable sources, and the indirect ap-
proach, which identifies distortions as deviations, or wedges, from a specific model, to evaluate
the size of overall misallocation in a economy or market. In this paper we develop a hybrid of
these two approaches by estimating the aggregate extent of misallocation and then allowing the
aggregate misallocation measure to be decomposed into specific sources (here, market power
and other factors). The approach also shifts the focus of measurement away from TFPR toward
the cost of production.2 Focusing on costs provides an alternative, data driven, approach to
measuring misallocation and allows results to be readily mapped to welfare metrics.
We apply our approach to the global oil industry, using detailed information on production
and costs from 13,248 oil fields, covering 92% of world production, from 1970 to 2014. The
contribution of market power to aggregate misallocation is investigated by considering the
production patterns of OPEC and its member states. Before delving deeper into the specifics of
our application, it is helpful to describe our approach to measurement, and its relation to the
broader misallocation literature, in general terms.
The point of departure of this paper is to focus on the area measured by comparing the real-
ized resource cost of production (the area under the actual marginal cost curve) to the efficient
resource cost of production (the area under the marginal cost curve achievable in absence of
any distortion). To illustrate why this is a measure of welfare loss arising from misallocation,
consider Figure 1. Figure 1 presents a stylized, graphical, representation of a market in which
market power is the sole imperfection. (The example is easily adapted to any distortion that
creates a tax wedge. What is required are wedges that differentially impact productive units.).
In Figure 1 there exists a producer with market power, with constant marginal cost MC1.
Also present in the market is a competitive, price-taking, fringe that has an aggregated marginal
cost curve given by MCf . The market price is equal to P , and the quantity produced by the
(low-cost) producer with market power, q1, is less than total production Q = q1 + q2, where q2
is the production of the fringe.3 In this setting, the production done by the fringe, q2, is done
1Contributions to this literature include Banerjee and Duflo (2005); De Mel et al. (2008); Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008); Hsieh and Klenow (2009); Bartelsman et al. (2013); Asker et al. (2014); David et al. (2016); Gopinath et al.
(2017). Surveys of this literature include Restuccia and Rogerson (2013, 2017) and Hopenhayn (2014).
2TFPR is revenue-based TFP (Foster et al., 2008). That is, if production (Q), for a given producer f , relies on a
bundle of inputs (X) using the production functionQf = AfXf , thenAf is quantity-based TFP (TFPQ) and Pf×Af
is TFPR (that is, TFP when outputs are measured via revenue).
3Strictly speaking, this means that MCf measures the marginal cost of the q2 − q1’th unit of production of the
fringe firms.
2
Figure 1: Production misallocation (resulting from market power)
MC1 
MCf  P 
q1 Q = q1+q2 QSP 
D 
Notes: q1 indicates total production from the cartel, while qf indicates production from the competitive fringe. The
producer with market power has marginal costs of MC1, while the fringe has the marginal cost schedule of MCf .
QSP is the social planner’s quantity.
at a higher resource cost than is socially optimal: Indeed, the low-cost producer should do all
the production. The welfare cost of this production misallocation is the shaded area. It is this
welfare cost, the rectangle, that we take as our measure of the full extent of misallocation. This
measure is referred to as productive inefficiency.
To measure the full extent of productive inefficiency in a market (the shaded rectangle in
Figure 1) it is necessary to observe the realized level of production and the marginal costs of
the infra-marginal units of production. In our setting, these are data. The central challenge
is to construct the marginal cost schedule absent distortions. For this, a model of efficient
production is required, as given by firm behavior in a competitive equilibrium, or equivalently,
as the solution to a social planner problem. Such a model, when combined with data, can
delver the required marginal cost schedule. Once this is completed, the extent of misallocation,
measured in welfare relevant terms, can be recovered.
A typical approach to measuring misallocation has been to assume that one market or econ-
omy (often the U.S.) is undistorted, and use this as a benchmark against which to measure the
extent to which other economies suffer from misallocation (see, for example, Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008)). By leveraging detailed micro-data on costs, what is
described here is a model-based alternative to this benchmark approach, which has the benefit
of being sufficiently micro-founded as to have a clear welfare interpretation.
This approach to measurement can be further extended if a plausible source of a particular
distortion is observed, or alternatively by explicit modeling the distortion. Once the full extent
of misallocation is recovered, this lets additional structure, separating out (say) market power,
to be imposed to asses the extent to which that distortion contributed to the overall level of
misallocation. In this sense, the cost-based approach to measurement explored in this paper
allows Rogerson’s direct and indirect approaches to studying misallocation to be combined.
In applications, a persistent challenge is allowing measurement to account for the interaction
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between observed and unobserved sources of distortion. The approach illustrated in this paper
accounts for this interdependence, and so relates the theory of the second best directly to the
misallocation literature.
Lastly, the distinction between the productive inefficiency arising from misallocation, and
the more familiar dead weight loss triangle arising from market imperfections is made readily
apparent in Figure 1. Both welfare losses are, of course, well appreciated.4 This paper distin-
guishes and quantifies the former source of welfare loss, as this is that part of the total welfare
loss arising from market imperfections that speaks directly to the extent of misallocation.
1.1 The link between misallocation and productive inefficiency
A direct link exists between the use of plant-level dispersion in TFPR as an indicator of mis-
allocation, as employed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and much of the literature that follows,
and the measures explored here, which exploits dispersion in (plant-level) marginal costs of
production to estimate productive inefficiency. Let the relevant productive-unit (firm, plant
or similar) be indexed by f and the degree of misallocation be indexed by M . In Hsieh and








where TFPR is revenue-based productivity (Foster et al. (2008)), and TFPRf is average TFPR.
That is, the standard deviation in TFPR is used as a measure of misallocation.5
To illustrate the link between this measure of misallocation, and that levered here, consider
the following simple model. The production function is Qf = AfXf .6 Further, in keeping with
Figure 1, assume that output is homogenous over productive units, and that the market for
inputs is competitive, implying a common output, P , and input prices, PX . Noting that TFPR
= P ×Af , this implies that dispersion in TFPR is proportional to dispersion in TFPQ, quantity
based productivity Af . Marginal cost is given by cf = PX/Af . It follows that, after a small
amount of algebra, the degree of misallocation M can be computed as







Hence, dispersion in the inverse of marginal cost is proportional to dispersion in TFPR, so
examining dispersion through the lens of TFPR or marginal cost is equivalent.
In the Hsieh and Klenow (2009) setting, the mapping from TFPR to TFPQ relies on model as-
sumptions on conduct and the shape of demand curve. Therefore, any model misspecification
on those two dimensions may lead the analyst to infer the presence of distortions. Haltiwanger
4Borenstein et al. (2002) and Cicala (2017) quantify the extent of productive inefficiency, due to market power in
the wholesale electricity market. In electricity markets, since retail prices are fixed, the demand curve is completely
inelastic, and thus there is no quantity distortion, only productive distortions.
5Hsieh and Klenow (2009) also use several other measures of dispersion. We focus on the standard deviation of
TFPR as it seems to be the one most often used.
6Xf can be thought of as an input index for a constant returns to scale technology.
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et al. (2018) note that the impact of any model misspecification in the Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
setting enters through either the implied misspecification of the elasticity of output price to
marginal cost or the elasticity of marginal cost to TFPQ. In the case of a homogeneous good
(like crude oil), this avoids any assumption on the elasticity of price to marginal cost and, in-
stead, the analysis rests on the cost data.
To the extent that we depart significantly from the existing misallocation literature, it is in
using productive inefficiency (the shaded area in Figure 1) as a measure of the quantitative
extent of misallocation. Merely examining the dispersion in marginal costs may be misleading
in comparing different markets. Consider two markets, indexed by j ∈ {1, 2}, each with two
firms. Firm Aj has marginal cost of 5, and firm Bj has marginal cost of 10. Both markets have
the same dispersion of marginal costs. However, if in the first market, firm A1 has a market
share of 90 percent, while in the second market firm A2 only has market share of 50 percent, we
would say there is more misallocation is the second market.7
Focusing explicitly on productive inefficiency also avoids confounding the welfare loss due
to output restrictions (the deadweight loss triangle in Figure 1) from arising from a distortion,
with its impact on misallocation. For instance, a pure monopoly in a market, like that repre-
sented in Figure 1, will have no TFPR or marginal cost dispersion, but will still impose a welfare
cost (the dead weight loss triangle). Hence, it is the productive inefficiency that speaks directly
to misallocation.
1.2 Application to global oil extraction
A predicate for misallocation is inter-firm heterogeneity in productivity, or the costs of produc-
tion. Given this, the application in this paper is the global upstream oil industry – an industry
with notable exogenous variation in costs across productive units, in large part attributable to
differences in geology.8 For instance, the world’s largest oil field, the Ghawar field in Saudi
Arabia, has average costs (in 2014 USD) of approximately $3 per barrel over the timeframe
covered by our data. By contrast, offshore fields in Norway and fracking shale deposits in the
Bakken in North Dakota, have costs of $12 and $24, respectively, per barrel.
The oil fields in low-cost, OPEC, countries have very large reserves and are depleted rela-
tively slowly: in 2014 Saudi Arabia’s active fields had 17 percent of global recoverable reserves
and were being depleted at close to half the speed of the mean non-OPEC field.9 This implies
production being diverted toward high-cost productive units, while low-cost productive units
were being utilized at comparatively lower rates – with discounting, this results in a welfare
7Hsieh and Klenow (2009) measure the full extent of misallocation by exploiting their general equilibrium frame-
work to optimally redeploy resources and measuring the resulting output expansion. In the partial equilibrium
setting here, this metric would be difficult to employ as redistributing resources within a single industry may result
in more output being generated than is demanded, resulting in a perverse welfare loss.
8 The literature has established that producers that compete in narrowly defined product markets can have very
different levels of productivity (see Syverson (2011, 2004); Foster et al. (2008) ). This heterogeneity has proved to be
key in predicting the impact of competition on many outcomes, such as the effect of trade or of a new technology on
individual producers, and industry-wide performance. See Olley and Pakes (1996); Melitz (2003); Syverson (2004);
Goldberg et al. (2010); Holmes and Schmitz (2010); Edmond et al. (2015); Atkeson and Burstein (2010); De Loecker
(2011); Collard-Wexler and De Loecker (2015) and De Loecker et al. (2016).
9OPEC had 50% of reserves and were being depleted at a slower rate than in the rest of the world. See Table 3.
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loss arising from misallocation.
We leverage a major feature of the oil industry that allows us to measure misallocation
without being subject to the standard model misspecification concerns: oil is by and large a ho-
mogeneous good, a commodity. This makes the presence of differences in the observed cost of
production immediately informative about differences in welfare-relevant resource costs. Sec-
ond, the data set we utilize allows us to directly observe the cost of production by oil field, and,
as such, gives a data environment in which to deploy the approach described above without
significant additional modeling.
That is, in terms of Figure 1, the object to be estimated is the proportion of production of
the low-cost firm if it were a price taker. This can then be compared to observed production
patterns to back out the shaded rectangle. Note that this does not require any structural mod-
eling of the observed market equilibrium. In particular, by holding the (observed) market-level
output fixed, this approach avoids having to model the existence and workings of the OPEC
cartel, which, in the context of the world oil market, is a complicated matter. It can, similarly,
take an agnostic approach to the way that other distortions manifest.
As foreshadowed in the previous paragraph, OPEC is a notable feature of the global oil
industry. For our purposes, OPEC gives rise to an observable driver of market-power and,
hence, misallocation (providing the link to the direct approach discussed above). Obviously,
any possible impact of OPEC likely interacts with the many other likely sources of distor-
tion in the global oil industry. It is well understood that there are a variety of other sources
potentially giving rise to misallocation, including (and by no means limited to) geopolitics,
within-country corruption, taxation, and an oft-expressed desire for self-sufficiency on the part
of many sovereign states.10 The decomposition of the full extent of misallocation into that
attributable to OPEC-related market power, and that attributable to other channels, raises con-
ceptual issues closely related to the issues raised in Lipsey and Lancaster (1956)’s articulation
of the theory of the second-best.
Despite all these these attractive features, a complication arising in measuring misallocation
in the the oil market is the finite resource extraction problem embedded in oil production. This
creates inter-temporal linkages of supply. By leveraging rich micro-data and a flexible dynamic
framework, productive inefficiency can be computed accounting for these dynamics
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short description of the oil mar-
ket, to which we apply our empirical framework, and introduces the unit of observation used
throughout the analysis. Section 3 introduces the theoretical structure common to the entire pa-
per. The preliminary evidence of the role of market power is presented in Section 4 by means of
reporting details of the cost distribution, production and reserves across units within countries
and regions. Section 5 presents the main results, and presents various robustness checks. Al-
ternative modeling choices are discussed and evaluated in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
10A particularly interesting factor in the context of developed countries, like the US, is the incentive to demon-
strate technological progress in developing oil production in what were thought to be infeasible locations in order
to raise proven reserves.
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2 The Oil Market: Production and Institutions
This section introduces some of the important institutional details of the global oil market.
In particular, these features of the upstream oil industry are important for understanding the
measurement issues that arise in handling the data. As a consequence, in what follows, we
introduce production units and the market-level institutions.11
2.1 Unit of analysis
The analysis in this paper focuses on the upstream oil industry (that part of the industry con-
cerned with extraction), as opposed to activity further downstream (such as refining). Data
on the upstream oil industry were obtained from Rystad Energy (Rystad hereafter), an energy
consultancy based in Norway that covers the global oil industry.
The data record all significant oil fields across the globe from 1970 through 2014, and as
such, constitute an unusually rich dataset compared with most studies of the oil market, which
either use detailed micro data on a small subset of oil fields (see Covert (2015)’s or Kellogg
(2014)’s study of recent activity in North Dakota Shale and Texas or Hendricks and Porter
(1988)’s earlier work on offshore oil in the Gulf of Mexico), or examine the global oil market
with data aggregated to the country level (see, for example, Kilian (2009)). For each field, the
data include annual production, reserves and a breakdown of operating and capital costs, as
well as the characteristics of the field, such as the location, geology and climate zone. The
distinction between a production unit (field) and its smaller components (wells) is important
since, in our data, we observe cost and production information at the field level. A field, in the
data, is defined as a geologically homogeneous oil production area.12 Fields vary considerably
in the number of wells and the associated infrastructure.13
The fact that the data cover all oil fields in the world implies that there is some hetero-
geneity across oil crudes produced at various locations. This leads to a series of measurement
issues. The first is how to measure the quantity associated with a deposit in units comparable
across deposits. The data measure output in energy equivalent barrels, where the benchmark
is one barrel of Brent Crude. Hence, the measure of quantity accounts for the compositional
heterogeneity of crudes. The second issue is that different crudes trade at different premia and
discounts related to their composition. Thus, the choice of a price index needs to be consistent
with the measure of quantity. The price of Brent Crude is the price measure used here to be
consistent with the production measure.14
11The Online Appendix (http:public.econ.duke.edu/~ac418/OnlineAppendix_Misallocation_Oil.pdf) pro-
vides the reader with a more detailed discussion of the data sources, measurement and on the specifics of oil pro-
duction. The code that was used for this project, but not the proprietary Rystad data used in the analysis, can be
found at (http://public.econ.duke.edu/~ac418/Replication_Files_No_Data_Oil_Misallocation.zip).
12Often coinciding with common management and ownership.
13For instance, in the data, the Gullfaks offshore field in Norway is decomposed into two separate oil fields;
Gullfaks, which has three oil platforms, and Gullfaks South, which has a single platform. On the other hand, the
Ghawar Uthmamiyah onshore field, which is one of the largest fields in the world, is composed of many hundred
wells. Different fields can, of course, be owned by a single owner.
14The unit cost of production of a field is strongly negatively correlated with the price of the oil it produces. That
is, low-quality oils tend to come from high-cost fields – see the Online Appendix for a discussion.
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Production units (oil fields) can have very different costs for exogenous (geological) reasons.
That is, a Norwegian deposit that exists in deep water far offshore or a Canadian tar sands de-
posit will have very different average (equivalently, marginal) costs of production as compared
to the larger onshore deposits in Saudi Arabia, for purely geological reasons. This means that
the vast proportion of the cost differences observed across time and field are pre-determined
by geology; the fundamental starting point for the analysis. Section 4.1 contains further de-
tails regarding measurement of the cost of production. We now turn to a brief overview of
market-wide conditions in the oil market.
2.2 The global oil market
The global upstream market for oil is characterized by a range of actors. The buyers are refiner-
ies. The producers are oil companies, which are state-run enterprises, substantially-state-run,
or independent enterprises. The state-run (nationalized) oil companies, can be split into those
that are run by OPEC states and those that are from non-OPEC states. Every OPEC coun-
try has its own nationalized company, which controls production, albeit at times contracting
with independents to run specific facilities. For instance, Saudi Arabia operates Saudi Aramco;
Kuwait operates the Kuwait Petroleum Company; and Ecuador operates Petroecuador.
Outside OPEC, nationalized (or substantially-state-run) companies exist in Mexico, Brazil,
Russia, China, Malaysia, Norway and India, and in several other smaller producing nations. In
other major producing countries (such as the USA, the UK or Canada), production is conducted
by private (independent) companies. These private companies can be divided into the five
(as of 2014) oil majors (ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, Royal Dutch Shell and Total) – all having
revenues in excess of 100 billion US dollars – and other independent companies.
Table 1 shows the production shares, for the period 1970-2014, of the seven largest OPEC
and non-OPEC countries. The US has the largest production, followed closely by Russia and
Saudi Arabia. While these three countries have the largest production, it is important to bear
in mind that production occurs in different ways within each country. The US is very decen-
tralized, having many private firms, while Saudi Arabia has a nationalized oil company (Saudi
Aramco).
In 2014 (the limit of the data) OPEC comprised the countries of Algeria, Angola, Ecuador,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Venezuela. The
membership has varied slightly over time, with the core Middle East membership being un-
changed from OPEC’s inception in 1960.15 Due to the relative stability of the OPEC mem-
bership and the likely close affiliations that may persist during periods of a country’s non-
membership, in handling the data we treat a country as an OPEC country if it had active mem-
bership between 1970 and 2014.
OPEC characterized its objective, in 2017, as being to “co-ordinate and unify petroleum
15The original membership in 1960 was Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. Other members are
listed together with the year they first joined OPEC, and (if appropriate) years in which membership was suspended
or terminated: Qatar (1961), Indonesia (1962, suspended 1/09), Libya (1962), the United Arab Emirates (1967),
Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973, suspended 12/92-8/07), Gabon (1975, terminated 1/95) and Angola
(2007). See www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm accessed 29 August 2016. The first 30 years of OPEC are
well documented in Yergin (1991) and Cre´mer and Salehi-Isfahani (1991).
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policies among Member Countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum pro-
ducers; an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a
fair return on capital to those investing in the industry”.16 Given this description, and its well
documented history of coordinated price and production policies, this paper views OPEC as a
cartel, albeit one that has varied in its effectiveness.
Figure 2 shows OPEC’s market share and the price of crude from 1970 to 2014. Before
OPEC started coordinating extensively on price reductions, it had a global production share
fluctuating around 48 percent. This fell to a low point of 29.2 percent in 1985 after reductions in
production during the late 70s and early 80s. Following that, OPEC’s share of production rose
to 40.6 percent in 1993 and has stayed relatively constant since then.17
3 Analytical framework
In a static environment, the definition of a productive inefficiency is intuitive: as Figure 1 il-
lustrates, it is the difference between the realized cost of production and the cost of producing
the same quantity, had all firms been price takers. In the empirical setting confronted here, a
purely static approach is inappropriate due to the finite nature of oil extraction.18 Thus, we
need to adopt a definition of productive inefficiency appropriate for a dynamic context.
Definition 1 Productive inefficiency is the net present value of the difference between the realized costs
of production, and the cost of production had the realized production path been produced by firms taking
prices as exogenous.
That is, the competitive benchmark is derived by holding the production in each year fixed
and shifting demand for that year inward until a competitive industry would have produced,
in equilibrium, the observed production. The path of costs of production thus generated is the
counterfactual benchmark against which realized costs are compared to measure the extent of
any production inefficiency.
Given the finiteness of the resource, it is clear that, at some finite end date, all resources
will have been extracted. Hence, the source of inefficiency, in an industry such as this, is via
sub-optimal inter-temporal substitution of production among production units. Given this, the
central economic object of interest is the order of extraction of assets that a competitive industry
would have undertaken. The central result of this section is to provide a characterization of that
order.
In addition to characterizing the extraction policy of the counterfactual competitive indus-
try (or, equivalently, the policy of the social planner), this section builds the underlying cost
function that is used to guide measurement and modeling. It also provides the algorithm used
to compute the solution to the social planner’s problem (equivalently, a competitive equilib-
rium). As usual, the data and empirical setting impose some additional measurement issues
16www.opec.org accessed 4/10/17.
17For more detail on OPEC and its history see the online appendix.
18There is a long literature in natural resource economics on non-renewable resources, starting with Hotelling
(1931), and some of the empirical tests of this model for oil are documented in Slade and Thille (2009) and Anderson
et al. (2018).
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that are discussed in the sections directly related to empirical analysis. This section focuses on
the details of the theoretical structure common to the entire paper.
3.1 Modeling Preliminaries: Costs
In modeling costs, the production unit is the field, denoted f , that is the unit of observation in
the most disaggregate data to which we have access to. For some of these fields, such as some
offshore oil platforms, a field is an oil well. However, for most of the onshore oil fields, a field
is composed of many different oil wells. Fields make input choices in order to minimize costs,
conditional on a given level of production.
Let the production function for a field f in year t, be given by:
qft = min {αftKft, γftLft} (3)
s.t. qft ≤ Rft, Rft = Rft−1 − qft−1
Rf0 > 0 Rft ≥ 0,
where K and L are fixed and variable inputs, respectively, and R are reserves. We write down
the model with capital and labor inputs (K and L), but of course these are meant to stand in for
the different inputs in the production process for oil, such as drilling equipment, production
workers, and energy. These coefficients are field-specific, and as such, subsume the differences
across technology (onshore, offshore, shale, etc.). The fact that the coefficients are allowed to
vary across fields also implies that they capture any Hicks-neutral productivity shocks ωft.19
Assume that the price of capital inputs is given by rft and the price of variable inputs is
given by wft. These input prices are assumed to be exogenous. This means that the total cost










Additional structure is put on the process governing the evolution of the ratio of input













This allows for variation in either field (Hicks-neutral) productivity, or common variation across
the ratio of input prices to technology, or a combination of both.










Marginal cost is then given by:
cft = MC (qft) = AC (qft) =
{
cfµft if qft ≤ Rft
+∞, otherwise, (7)










. That is, costs have a hockey stick shape: constant marginal costs up
to a capacity constraint given by reserves. From a measurement point of view, the constant
returns to scale assumption on the components of the Leontief production function provides
economic assumptions under which average cost and marginal cost are equal, and, thus, costs
are invariant to changes in demand conditions.
We further assume that µft is governed by a martingale process such that E (µft+k |µft ) =
µft for k ≥ 1.20 This µft term captures the convolution of long-run trends in technological
change, and changes in the absolute or relative cost of inputs or technology parameters (γ
and α). The process determining µft is assumed to be exogenous, which is an assumption
with economic content and underscores the partial equilibrium nature of the exercise being
conducted here. In an alternate, broader, context, µft is an equilibrium object. In particular, if
lower-cost fields get extracted first in the competitive counterfactual (as is the case), and these
lower-cost fields have lower input intensity, and the inputs are specialized, such that they are
not readily deployable in some other sector, then this reallocation of production could change
the equilibrium value of µft.
3.2 Production paths in competitive equilibrium
In competitive equilibrium, all producers take prices as given. Let δ be the common discount





t−1 (pt − cf ) qft (8)
s.t. Rf0 ≥
∑T
t=1 qft, and qft ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ {1, · · · , T}.
Proposition 1 and corollary 1 together establish that the lowest-cost fields are extracted first
in any competitive equilibrium.22
Proposition 1 Let marginal costs be described by equation 7. Consider two fields, F and F , with cf




Proof. Toward a contradiction, assume not. Consider two periods such that, w.l.o.g., t =
t2 > t1 = 1. Consider a single unit of production for both F and F , such that q = q = 1 (since
marginal costs at the field level are constant, this is w.l.o.g.). Employ the normalization µf1 = 1.
Hence, E (µft |µf1 ) = 1. Thus E (cfµft |cfµf1 ) = cf . We assume by contradiction that q1 = 1
and q
1
= 0. Then, there must exist periods such that
20This implies that we assume the same process for both Hicks-neutral productivity shocks and input prices.
21If prices are not known, it is assumed that all producers have the same expectations. In the maximand, the price
process is assumed to be known merely to keep notation simple. There are no fixed or setup costs. A treatment
thereof is in Section 6.2.
22The proposition and corollary are stated so as to align with the empirical model taken to the data. In fact, these
results can be stated somewhat more generally. The key feature is to note that the proof can be applied at the barrel
level. An implication is that, provided that the cost function is multiplicatively or additively separable in µft, non-
constant (increasing) marginal costs can be accommodated at the field level – i.e., the functional form assumptions
on the production function can be relaxed.
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δt−1 (pt − c) ≥ (p1 − c) (9)
and
δt−1 (pt − c) ≤ (p1 − c) , (10)
where at least one inequality is strict. Assume, for exposition, that the inequality in equation
10 is strict.
From equation 9,
δt−1 (pt − c) + δt−1 (c− c) ≥ (p1 − c) + (c− c) , (11)
Since δt−1 (c− c) < (c− c), this implies that δt−1 (pt − c) ≥ (p1 − c), which is a violation of
equation 10.
Corollary 1 In any competitive equilibrium, if c < c, then if Rt > 0, qt > 0 does not imply qt > 0.
Proof. This follows the line of argument used above, noting that δt−1
(
C − C) > (C − C).
An immediate implication is that when low-cost fields are not being exploited prior to higher-
cost fields coming on line, this is an indication of the presence of market distortions.23 The
implication that in a competitive equilibrium, lower cost resources are extracted first has pre-
viously been noted by, for instance, Herfindahl (1967) and Solow and Wan (1976).
Unsurprisingly, given the first welfare theorem, the production plan resulting from the com-
petitive equilibrium coincides with that of the social planner that seeks to minimize the social
cost of producing that production plan.
Lemma 1 The social planner’s production plan, which minimizes the net present value of costs subject
to satisfying a aggregate production path, coincides with that of the competitive equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is straightforward, and proceeds via contradiction.
Following proposition 1, the production path resulting from a competitive equilibrium
(or equivalently, the social planner’s solution), which generates known aggregate production
(equivalently consumption) levels in each year (Qt), can be computed using the following al-
gorithm (which we refer to in later sections as the Sorting Algorithm): 1) Start in year t = 1; 2)
set the field index i to order fields from lowest to highest marginal cost given costs, cfµft, such
that a lower i corresponds to a lower cost; 3) start with i = 1; 4) drain field i until remaining
reserves equal zero (Rit − qit = 0) or the aggregate production target is met (
∑i
j=1 qjt = Qt).
Update remaining reserves for this field (set Ri,t+1 = Rit− qit); 5) if
∑i
j=1 qjt < Qt, set i = i+ 1,
and go back to step 4; 6 set t = t+ 1 and 7) if remaining reserves are positive for any field and
t < T , go to step 2, or else, stop.
This algorithm is used to generate the counterfactual production path, against which the
observed production path is compared to measure the extent of production misallocation.
23Consistent with this, firms with market power have an incentive to delay extraction to push prices higher. Any
residual demand that results will be absorbed by fringe producers, with higher unit costs. See Sweeney (1993) for
an extended discussion of the comparison of competitive equilibrium and equilibrium with market power in these
settings.
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4 Descriptive evidence of productive inefficiency
Central to the existence of a productive inefficiency is the existence of cost dispersion between
productive units, as well as the capacity of low-cost units to expand production to displace
the production of high-cost units. This section documents these features in the data. It also
provides reduced-form evidence consistent with the existence of market power by OPEC, and
by Saudi Arabia in particular. We begin by introducing the dataset and providing summary
statistics of the main variables used throughout the analysis.
4.1 Data
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the 13,248 active fields in the data across the entire
sample. The average field produces 3.4 million barrels per year and has reserves of 99 million
barrels (the medians, are 0.2 and 3.7, respectively). There is wide variation in field size, with the
5th percentile field producing fewer than 1,000 barrels, and the 95th percentile field producing
11 million barrels. The largest annual production for a field observed in the data was that of
the Samotlor field in Siberia in 1980 with almost 1.2 billion barrels produced that year. Almost
19 percent of fields are offshore. The analysis presented in this paper is restricted to fields that
were active at some point between 1970 and 2014.24
Given the Leontief production function, yielding the cost function given by equation (7),
the average and marginal cost of oil production are the same. Hence, the marginal cost of
production is recovered by dividing the total cost of production by the reported production,
qft, (in million bbl/day), and the total cost of production is obtained by summing over the
cost categories as listed in table A.1, in the Appendix. In particular, our baseline measure of






where the various expenditure categories are h={Well Capital, Facility Capital, Abandonment
cost, Production Operating,Transportation Operating, and SGA}, and all expenditures are de-
flated by the US GDP deflator with 2009 as the base year.25 This specification rules out curva-
ture in the cost schedule as an oil well gets depleted. Given this, careful consideration of the
nature of the Leontief assumption is warranted. As in every production process, some fixed
costs and scale effects undoubtedly exist in this industry. It is helpful to keep in mind the level
of aggregation at which the analysis is being done. The analysis is industry-wide, aggregating
the equivalent of an industry supply curve over all fields.26 The Leontief technology assump-
tion makes this supply curve a step function. Modeling each well and aggregating up would,
24Of the 66,920 fields in the Rystad data, 45,687 of these did not produce between 1970 and 2014. The cost and
reserves data on these fields are based solely based on engineering and geological modeling, and these fields are
not used in the paper. More detail on the sample frame can be found in the Online Appendix.
25Robustness of results with respect to the inclusion or omission of capital expenditures is discussed in the online
appendix.
26In Section 5 we use 11,455 fields, rather than the reported number of fields (13, 248) reported in the summary
statistics, since we drop fields with no reported discovery year. This leaves us with 99.985 percent of global reserves.
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at best, put a small amount of curvature in each step, which, given the level of aggregation,
would be difficult to notice for the typical field. When quantifying the production misalloca-
tion, in Section 5, we employ a measure of marginal cost admitting curvature in the cost of
production coming from aggregate shocks in input markets and technology, and we verify the
robustness of our results to the presence of within-field curvature (Section 6.3).
Central to much of the discussion in this paper is the notion of reserves. The reserve is
the unextracted, but recoverable, quantity of oil remaining in the ground in a field. The most
reliable way to measure the reserve at a point in time is to see the entire production life of a field.
The total extracted oil is the maximal reserve. Most fields are not fully exploited in the data.
Hence, industry reserve estimates need to be used. The oil industry reports reserves at different
levels of extraction probability. There are three levels. P90 (or P1) is the quantity able to be
recovered with a 90 percent probability, given current technical and economic conditions. The
P90 reserve is the asset value that can be reported on company balance sheets under U.S. GAAP.
Clearly, this definition means that reserves will fluctuate with the oil price. In the data used
here, reserves are measured and reported assuming an oil price of $70 (in 2014 dollars), which
is closest to the historical average price for oil. P50 (or P1 + P2) are the reserves recoverable with
a 50 percent probability. Finally, P10 or (P1 + P2 + P3) are total reserves recoverable with a 10
percent chance. The level of P90, P50 and P10 can vary significantly within a field. For instance,
in the North Ward Estes field discussed above, P90, P50 and P10 in 1975 were estimated at 26.6,
56.4 and 66.4 million barrels, respectively.
In this paper, in descriptive discussions (prior to Section 5,) P50 values at an oil price of $70
a barrel are used to report reserves. In section 5, a field’s reserves in 1970 are computed as the
sum of: i) the actual production history from 1970 to 2014; and ii) the P50 value at an oil price
of $70 a barrel in 2014.
4.2 Preliminary Evidence
We begin by focusing on a small number of major oil-producing nations. By focusing on a small
number of countries, we can illustrate more features of the underlying data. Attention is then
shifted to the entire global market in which the aggregate data is shown to mirror the patterns
observed in the more detailed country-level analysis.
Figures 3 and 4 show moments of the distribution of production costs for each year from
1970-2014, for each of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Venezuela, and Nigeria (OPEC Countries, Figure
3); and the United States, Russia, Canada, and Norway (non-OPEC Countries, Figure 4). In
the context of the wider misallocation literature, these figures are the analog of the standard
deviations of TFPR reported in, for instance, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) (see section 1.1).
Panel (a) of Figure 3 examines Saudi Arabia. The solid black line is the oil price. Below
that, for each year, is a black bar that shows the range of costs lying between the 5th and 95th
percentiles, where the unit of observation is the barrel. That is, 90 percent of barrels produced
by Saudi Arabia in a year have a unit cost lying in the range indicated by the black bar. The
grey bar combined with the black bar indicates the range of costs between the 1st and 99th
percentiles. Where circles are shown, these indicate the maximum unit cost for the country.
An examination of Figure 3 illustrates the tight range of costs for Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti
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production. For both countries, costs per barrel rarely exceed $10. Further, costs are stable
relative to the oil price. By contrast, costs in Venezuela and Nigeria are much higher and exhibit
much greater dispersion. This is an important feature of the data, suggesting that, even within
OPEC, scope exists for efficiency gains due to reallocation of production. If OPEC were run
as an efficient cartel, this feature would not exist, as allocations would be determined by a
constrained social planner, with the production path having the same features as in Proposition
1. Given the many internal and external political challenges faced by OPEC– which mirror
those faced by any real-world cartel – it is unsurprising that it fails to act as a theoretically
efficient cartel might.27
Figure 4 allows us to compare the within-OPEC patterns in Figure 3 with those in non-
OPEC countries. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4 show the US and Russia, the two biggest oil
producers between 1970 and 2014. Both the US and Russia have more dispersion in costs than
that observed in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, although a significant proportion of production, par-
ticularly prior to 2000, has equivalent costs. Importantly, the more expensive production in
both countries occurs at cost levels more than twice the levels than that characterize produc-
tion in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. This is particularly pronounced in the years following 2000,
and particularly in the US, where the ramp up in high-cost production follows the rise in the
oil price and is largely driven by unconventional onshore production (mostly shale). In 2014,
2039 million barrels were produced by shale (out of 4173 million barrels produced in the United
States). These shale deposits had units cost of 32.6 dollars per barrel, while onshore fields had
unit costs of 7.4 dollars per barrel (production weighted averages). By contrast, in 2005, shale
accounted for only 24 million out of 2480 million barrels produced in the United States, and
costs for onshore fields were 7.3 dollars per barrel. Thus, much of the large increase in costs
in the United States is driven by the increased production from shale. Canada mirrors the US,
with a similar ramp up in costs following 2000.
Norway is distinct from the three other countries in Figure 4, by virtue of having the vast
majority of its production offshore. This accounts for the late start in production. Deepwater
offshore drilling technology became commercially viable only in the late 1970s. The spikes
in the ranges of unit costs reflect the starting years of oil rigs, the low production levels that
the first year of production often brings, and the large scale of the infrastructure involved.28
Interestingly, the rise in the oil price following 2000 brings an increase in the dispersion of
costs, albeit in a much more muted way relative to the US and Canada.
The comparison between the dispersions in production costs in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and
the other six countries in Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the considerable scope for reallocation that
exists. Dispersion in production costs is ubiquitous, and has been documented in a variety
of settings ranging from manufacturing to services – see Syverson (2011) for an overview of
the literature. Compared to the reported dispersion in productivity (measured by TFP) in the
studies cited in Syverson, the dispersion in oil production is high; there is a 1 : 9 ratio between
27See Asker (2010) for another example of an inefficient real-world cartel. Marshall and Marx (2012) provide an
overview of a large number of cartels and the related theoretical and empirical work that organizes our understand-
ing of them.
28The lumpiness observed here is inevitable. A large offshore project will involve many wells coming on line in
the same year. If production starts late in the year, little production will be recorded, despite a large expenditure on
infrastructure. Setup costs are discussed in Section 6.2.
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the 10th and 90th percentiles of cost. This is markedly higher than in most industries and is
especially surprising since, for the oil industry, measurement is not contaminated by variation
in output prices, which is a common issue in the literature (see De Loecker (2011)). Further, the
low costs that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait enjoy make it clear that, in a competitive equilibrium,
these countries would be exhausting their deposits, subject to physical limits on extraction
speeds, before the more speculative fields observed in the upper portions of other countries’
costs distribution come online (see Proposition 1).
The extent to which the result in Proposition 1 is useful in interpreting the data rests on the
plausibility of the following counterexample: if the low-cost fields in Kuwait are constrained by
reserves, while those in Canada are not, then it is not surprising that there is no scope for low-
cost countries to expand production. In Table 3, we show reserves in different regions of the
world, as well as the ratio of reserves to production (that is, the number of years that a region
could produce at the current rate) for 2014. Outside OPEC, the ratio of reserves to production
is 10, while in OPEC countries, the ratio is 19. Hence, the data are consistent with the members
of OPEC restricting production, relative to reserves, more than producers outside the cartel. As
one might expect, the data are consistent with OPEC, and Saudi Arabia in particular, exercising
market power.29
The patterns observed in comparing the eight countries in Figures 3 and 4, are reflected in
Table 4, which compares production, reserves and costs over time for Saudi Arabia, OPEC and
all non-OPEC countries. Unit costs are reported using both the baseline specification, which
omits taxes and royalties, and the alternative specification that includes taxes and royalty pay-
ments. Considerable scope for reallocation exists in each period, with the scope increasing as
time goes on. This is not surprising, as distortions persist and low-cost OPEC deposits remain
significant; in later periods, higher-cost deposits should come online as lower cost, non-OPEC,
deposits get exhausted. Hence, the potential for gains from reallocation should get larger over
time. This is the case regardless of whether the baseline or the alternative cost specification is
used.
5 Quantifying the extent of misallocation
This section quantifies the extent to which production is misallocated, followed by quantifi-
cation of market power as a specific source of misallocation. We do this by using the model
described in Section 3 to compute a counterfactual production path, which we then compare
with the actual production path to quantify the cost of misallocation. This requires the model
to be parameterized. The details of this parameterization are found in the subsection below.
Following that, we discuss the logic by which misallocation is attributable to market power.
The results then follow, together with a series of robustness tests.
29Other Middle East states, like Kuwait, also behave in ways consistent with market power. We focus on OPEC
and Saudi Arabia since OPEC is the joint vehicle and Saudi Arabia has the largest reserves and production.
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5.1 Model parameterization
The Sorting Algorithm described at the end of Subsection 3.2 is used to compute the competitive
allocation (production path) in the counterfactual model described in Section 3. The inputs
required are the aggregate production levels, Qt, field-level total reserves, Rft=1, and field-
year costs, cfµft. The remaining element required is a social annual discount factor, needed to
compute a net present value of any accumulated distortions. This is set at 0.95.
Aggregate production is observed in each year from 1970-2014, and it is assumed that mar-
kets clear within the year, so that annual demand and production are equivalent. For years
following 2014, global production (equivalently, demand) is assumed to grow at a rate of 1.3
percent per year, which is the (geometric) average growth rate observed for 1970-2014.
Reserves, as described above, are measured using P50 reserve figures, assessed at a price
per barrel of $70 in 2014 dollars. Since reserves fluctuate somewhat over time for a given field,
the actual production up to 2014 is added to the P50 reserve level in 2014 to give the reserve
level for a given field available in 1970.30
Field-level costs are the central input required by our algorithm, and recovering cfµft from
the cost data is the central aspect of generating this input. However, some auxiliary modeling
elements, that bear on costs, are also relevant. The auxiliary elements are dealt with first. Then
the recovery of cfµft is discussed.
The first auxiliary element is that the path of field discovery is assumed to be exogenous.
Hence, for a field discovered in 1980, the cost of production is infinite prior to that date. Sim-
ilarly, fields that are never observed to have produced between 1970 and 2014 are excluded.
This is equivalent to assuming that the cost of these fields are infinite.
The second auxiliary element is the imposition of a limit on the proportion of Ri,t=1 that
can be extracted in each year. The model in Section 3 assumes that any amount of oil may
be extracted, up to the limit of available reserves, in any year. This is clearly a simplification.
A range of engineering and geological factors can limit the proportion of reserves that can be
extracted from a field in any given year, not least of which is the need to maintain a minimum
level of pressure in the well so as to make extraction feasible – extraction that is too fast can
lead to sharp drops in well pressure. The median producing field extracts 1.9 percent of its
maximal reserves per year, and the 95th percentile field extracts 25.5 percent. The mean extrac-
tion rate in non-OPEC countries was 10 percent in 2014 (see Table 3). Given that in the main
specification, the upper limit on the rate at which a field of can extract reserves is given by
max{xf , 10%}, where xf is the maximal proportion of reserves extracted, in any year, for that
field. The algorithm is easily adjusted to accommodate these auxiliary model elements, and
we will present robustness checks where the extraction rate is alternatively chosen to be two
percent, or unrestricted.31
We now turn to recovery of cfµft from the cost data. Unit costs for a field-year are measured
30For some fields, we see reserves increasing over time, most likely because of new discoveries inside the field,
and improvements in technology that make more oil recoverable. If we had used reserves reported in 1970, this
would led us to the uncomfortable position of having more oil extracted in the period 1970-2015 than reported
reserves in 1970, at least for certain regions of the world.
31All that is required is that the algorithm keep track of activity in a year and set prices to be infinite once the
relevant field-level limits are reached. Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 are similarly unaffected.
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as described in Section 4.1. These unit costs, denoted cft, need to be decomposed into three
elements: 1) the time-invariant marginal cost, cf ; 2) a technology-year specific cost shifter, µst,
where s indexes the technology (onshore and offshore); and 3) measurement error, exp (ft).
That is,
cft = cfµft = cfµst exp (ft). (13)
In the counterfactual, production undertaken by field f in year t is taken to have occurred at




κft ln cft, (14)




servations are weighted by production, as opposed to giving all fields equal weighting, since a
field is an already aggregated unit of production, with the extent of aggregation varying across
fields.
The time-invariant marginal cost, cf , is then estimated, allowing for measurement error,
using the following (within-field) regression:
(ln cft − µˆst) = ln cˆf + ft. (15)
Estimation is conducted using weighted least squares, with the weights being the proportion
of total field output done in that year.
Where confidence intervals are reported, they are computed via a bootstrap. Specifically,
we employ a two-step bootstrap routine. In the first step, for each resample k, we take the
true dataset and resample field-year observations ft and compute µkst. In the second step, for
each field in the true dataset, the field-years are resampled. This allows us to estimate ckf using
the µkst from the first step.32 This, in turn, allows ckfµ
k
st to be computed using the algorithm
to compute counterfactual predictions. The goal of this procedure is to capture the estimation
error in not only the field-technology coefficient µs,t, but also in the field-specific coefficient cf .
Fifty bootstrap iterations are used.
5.2 Identification of misallocation costs attributable to market power
To quantify the role of market power in distorting the efficient allocation of resources, the
(counterfactual) path of extraction when firms are undistorted price takers needs to be com-
puted. This is done with the sorting algorithm, using the cost measures described above. We
then compute the total cost of production distortion by comparing the net present value of the
costs of production from the observed cost of production to that from the counterfactual path.
There are two challenges to identifying the economic impact of misallocation plausibly at-
tributable to market power in the oil market. First, it is unlikely that every instance of misal-
location can be attributed to market power. Second, the data do not extend past 2014, which
means that we do not see extraction paths in the data beyond this point.
32The field-year observations used to compute µkst are resampled independently from those used to compute each
ckf . The practical reason to do this is that there a few large fields composed of tens of thousands of individual oil
wells, such as Saudi Arabia’s Ghawar fields, that have large, and central, effects in the counterfactual exercises.
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In the absence of any other source of distortion, measuring distortions due to market power
would be straightforward. The net present value, at 1970, of the cost of the observed produc-
tion path would be compared to the net present value of the competitive equilibrium produc-
tion path. The difference between the two would be the misallocative effect of market power
measured as a stock in 1970 (we will present numbers deflated to 2014 dollars to make dollar
numbers comparable across the paper).
To focus the measurement on market power, it is necessary to articulate where market
power is held. In the context of the global oil market, given the evidence presented in Sec-
tions 2 and 4, market power could be exercised by Saudi Arabia, by some intermediate subset
of OPEC or by OPEC as a whole. When, for illustrative purposes, OPEC is considered the
repository of market power, this still leaves distortions outside and within OPEC to consider.
Given this, we proceed by solving a series of constrained social planner problems.
First, we solve for the competitive allocation, holding each country’s production level in
each year fixed. This removes internal distortions likely not attributable to market power. The
second set of distortions to be removed are production distortions across both OPEC and non-
OPEC countries. We remove these by computing the sorting algorithm, imposing the constraint
that total non-OPEC production each year must be that observed in the data. The NPV of the
cost of production from this path can then be compared to that from the unconstrained solu-
tion to the sorting algorithm. This gives the cost of two types of misallocation: the misalloca-
tion of production across OPEC and non-OPEC countries; and the misallocation of production
within OPEC and non-OPEC countries. Third, holding OPEC production fixed, we solve for
the competitive allocation again. This means that the undistorted market is free to reallocate
production both within a country and across countries, subject to keeping OPEC production
in each year the same as is observed in data. Lastly, the unconstrained competitive allocation
is computed, which we call the (world) optimal solution. This allocation is required to deliver
only the global production observed in each year in the data. Holding OPEC production con-
stant, we take the difference between the competitive allocation and the optimal solution to be
the distortion attributable to OPEC.
Almost surely, this measure of misallocation is conservative, and, thus, we call it a lower
bound. In particular, it removes the distortions that emerge within OPEC itself that may be due
to the political constraints that need to be met for OPEC to exercise any market power. That
is, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait likely need to assign a positive quota to Venezuela in order to
give them some rents from complying with the overall OPEC production plan. In most years,
an efficient cartel would not have Venezuela producing. In the computation described above,
distortions of this sort are not considered. Given that many real cartels are observed to use in-
efficient mechanisms to coordinate, at least some of the misallocation within OPEC should be
attributable to the coordinated exercise of market power. See Marshall and Marx (2012) for an
extensive overview, and Asker (2010) for a specific example. In addition, some of the within- or
across-country distortions seen in countries outside OPEC may be due to strategic responses
to OPEC production plans. To understand the extent to which this can further increase the
misallocation attributable to market power, a competitive allocation in which only the country
allocations within OPEC are held fixed is computed. This is then compared to the world opti-
mal solution. The difference provides an upper bound for the measure of inefficiency due to
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market power, in which misallocation across OPEC countries is assumed to be entirely caused
by the inefficient cartel mechanism.
Finally, we need to address the censoring in the data, such that production paths past 2014
are not observed. Given that oil is a finite resource, the central source of misallocative cost will
be due to fields that are cheap to exploit being delayed, such that the resulting gains from trade
occur in the future are discounted. This means that the future actual path of production matters
for a measure of misallocation, as the more the exploitation of cheap resources are delayed,
the greater the misallocation.33 In the face of the inevitable censoring, we take a conservative
approach. To project the path of “actual” production out past 2014, we compute the competitive
solution, taking the stocks in each country at the end of 2014 as initial state variables. This
means that there is no new distortion introduced to the path of actual production after the end
of the data. As a result, the misallocation numbers we report are an underestimate of the true
magnitude.34
The approach to isolating the impact of market power performed here measures the ex-
tent to which market power, on its own, moves the market away from prefect competition.
In this sense, it measures the infra-marginal impact of market power. An alternative would
be to attempt to model all the other sources of distortion in the market and then to estimate
the marginal impact of market power on market outcomes, conditional on all other distor-
tions. This would be a measurement exercise in the spirit of Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) and
Buchanan (1969). Both the infra-marginal and marginal approaches are complementary in de-
riving an understanding of the force of market power in shaping the world oil market. The
infra-marginal approach to measurement is the primary measure employed in this paper, as
it keeps the analysis closer to the core data on costs. Measurement of the marginal impact of
market power is explored in Section 6.1.
5.3 Results
We report results for paths from two different sample periods, 1970-2014 (the range of ob-
served data) and 1970-2100 (when all fields active during the period covered by the data are
exhausted). These dynamic measures collapse a lot of economic richness into a single NPV cal-
culation. For this reason, we also discuss a static decomposition, as it gives some insight into
the changing nature of distortions over time and the underlying mechanism of the model.
33Our measure of distortions is also distorted even further because we consider only the contribution of fields
that have produced in the data from 1970 to 2014. There are many fields that have yet to come online, and the costs
of these fields, based on Rystad’s estimates for unexploited oil reserves, are reported as being considerably cheaper
in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait than in the rest of the world. However, incorporating these fields would require us to
take a different approach to measurement, relying strongly on the accuracy of Rystad’s cost forecasting model.
34Another option would be to use a fully specified structural model of OPEC and other producers to simulate
this forward. Among other things, this would require capturing, in a parsimonious model, the geo-political aspects
of OPEC, and world oil production generally, which seem beyond the scope of the current exercise. Instead, we opt
for an approach that introduces a clear conservative bias.
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5.3.1 Dynamic productive inefficiency
We first compute productive inefficiency from the full dynamic model. We calculate the net
present value of the cost of production of the entire observed quantity path in our sample,
1970-2014, starting in 1970. We also consider a longer time period, 1970-2100, for which we
forecast our demand for oil beyond 2014 using a 1.3 percent annual growth rate.35
We begin by examining the counterfactual path computed by the unconstrained sorting
algorithm. This path is compared to the actual path in Figure 5, which plots the market share
of OPEC in the actual and counterfactual paths over time. On the actual (observed) path,
the production share of OPEC fluctuates by around 50 percent between 1970-1980. On the
counterfactual path, this share jumps to to over 90 percent. This reflects the inter-temporal
substitution of low-cost production (OPEC) for higher-cost production that is the source of
production misallocation in this industry. Diving more deeply into which fields would produce
in the competitive equilibrium in these early years, over 90 percent of world output in the 1970s
would come from three fields: Ghawar Shedgum and Ghawar Uthmaniyah in Saudi Arabia,
and Greater Burgan in Kuwait. Unsurprisingly, it is Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that are often
pointed to by industry commentators as leaders in the OPEC cartel. It takes until the mid-
1990s for the production share of OPEC in the counterfactual and the actual path to converge,
suggesting a substantial amount of misallocation.
The extent of this misallocation is reported in Table 5. The left column reports results for
the years 1970-2014, the extent of our data, while the right column reports results for 1970-2100,
which corresponds to the exhaustion of all resources in our sample. The 1970-2100 results allow
for the inter-temporal substitution of production to be fully incorporated into the calculation,
but in doing so, we make the conservative assumption that after 2014, the actual path of extrac-
tion is determined by the solution to the social planner’s problem, taking conditions at the end
of 2014 as initial conditions. The 1970-2014 results are provided to give a sense of the influence
of this assumption.
Focusing on the 1970-2100 results, the cost of the actual path of extraction (actual up to 2014
and the social planner’s thereafter) is 2.499 trillion in 2014 dollars. The cost of the counterfactual
path in which all market actors are undistorted price takers is 1.757 trillion (2014) dollars. That
is, the counterfactual costs are measured to be 70.3 percent of the actual costs. The difference be-
tween the two, 742 billion (2014) dollars, is the extent of the total distortion in the market. This
is decomposed into within-country distortions for non-OPEC and OPEC countries (38% and
21% of the total distortion, respectively); across-country distortions between non-OPEC coun-
tries (19% of the total distortion); across-country distortions between OPEC countries (7.8% of
the total distortion); and the distortion between OPEC and non-OPEC countries (13.9% of the
total distortion).
Within-country distortions can be attributed to wedges that move national production away
from cost minimization. Examples of the sources of such distortions might include: political
economy forces directing production to specific regions to, for instance, promote employment;
region taxation (e.g., different payroll tax rates in different U.S. states); risk factors not fully
35In practice, given that the sample does not include untapped fields as of 2014, oil production ceases in around
2035, depending on the exact model specification.
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captured by input cost measures (e.g., armed conflict in specific regions of a country); natural
events (e.g., the impact of hurricane Katrina would be counted as a distortion in this frame-
work); or environmental restrictions, or other regulatory frictions, that are location-specific.
These distortions are explored empirically in section 5.3.2.
Across-country distortions can come from similar sources, albeit acting at the cross-country
level. For instance, a national oil production tax could impact all national production equally
but could drive a wedge between national production and competing international produc-
tion. Across-country distortions for OPEC countries are particularly interesting as an addi-
tional source of distortion, such as the quota-like agreements that OPEC has periodically used
to coordinate production cuts across its members. To the extent that these arrangements re-
strict the low-cost producers while giving freedom to the high-cost producers, they contribute
to distortions in the rest of the market. Thus, at least some of the across-country distortion in
OPEC countries is likely attributable to OPEC’s coordinated exercise of market power. Finally,
OPEC’s self-imposed production restrictions distort production, leading to a higher proportion
of production coming from non-OPEC countries. This gives rise to the final source of distortion.
Of these sources of distortion, a lower bound is derived by focusing on the distortion be-
tween OPEC and non-OPEC countries. This is a lower bound because it ignores the inefficiency
of the OPEC mechanism itself. An upper bound is derived by adding the across-country distor-
tions between OPEC countries to this lower bound. This leads to a lower and upper bound of
103 and 161 billion dollars, respectively, or 13.9 percent and 21.6 percent of the total distortion.
Of note is that misallocation resulting from the internal structure of the cartel is estimated to
account for up to 36 percent of the overall production distortion generated by OPEC’s exercise
of market power.36
To give a sense of scale, recall that the NPV of actual costs is a (conservative) estimate
of the full realized resource cost of production. The estimate of the distortionary impact of
market power represents 6.4 percent of the full resource cost of production. By comparison,
29.7 percent of the total resource cost is attributable to some form of distortion. Given that the
total distortion measure includes acts of nature and other acts (such as wars) that lie beyond
the reach of mainstream economic policy, the fact that market power can plausibly account
for 21.6 percent of the total distortion in the market seems to suggest that market power is
a significant policy-relevant source of distortion. This is further emphasized by noting that,
at times, countries outside OPEC have coordinated with OPEC to guide world price (notably
Russia and Norway in the late 1990s), suggesting that market power distortions may also be
found in places other than OPEC in this market.
5.3.2 Static productive inefficiency
The measure from the full dynamic model, in Table 5, provides a quantification of misallocation
taking into account the full extent of the inter-temporal substitution of production. In doing so,
it collapses everything into a single NPV computation. While this is model-consistent, it hides
aspects of the model mechanics and also anchors everything to the starting date of our setting,
1970. In this section, “static distortions” are reported to complement the results from the full
36Asker (2010) finds a similar magnitude of cartel inefficiency.
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dynamic model. These static distortions are computed by taking the observed initial condi-
tions at the start of each year as given, and computing a counterfactual path from those initial
conditions. The distortion for only that year is reported. That is, for 2014, we take as initial
conditions the state of the global market at the end of 2013 and run the sorting algorithm from
that starting point. This gives us the counterfactual production for 2014, which we compare to
actual production for 2014. This computation gives a sense of the extent to which misallocation
varies by year, taking as initial conditions the actual market conduct in all previous years.
In Figure 6, static distortions, reported as costs, are shown for each year from 1970 to 2014,
together with decompositions into components that mirror those discussed in Table 5. The
time-series of the size of the overall distortion follows the rise, fall and rise of the oil price.
This is to be expected, as a higher oil price will attract entry by marginal producers, with these
marginal producers having higher costs as the oil price rises. Hence, as the oil price rises,
the marginal unit of withheld production attracts a higher-cost substitute. Given this, it is
unsurprising that recent higher oil prices coincide with higher distortions. This effect is com-
pounded, at least to some extent given other distortions, by the mechanical process by which
lower-cost non-OPEC reserves are depleted earlier, resulting in the marginal producer in later
years having a higher resource cost. Nonetheless, in years post-2008, over 25 percent of the
total static distortions shown here are attributable to OPEC’s exercise of market power (the
combined black and grey components of each bar).
Next, as noted in section 5.3.1, within-country distortions can be attributed to wedges that
move national production away from cost minimization. Figure 7 shows within-country vari-
ation across time in the extent of deviations from cost minimization. More precisely, the ratio
of total observed cost and cost-minimizing (optimal) cost, taking the actual production up that
year as an initial condition (as per static distortion calculations) and holding country produc-
tion fixed, is computed for each year (i.e., annual within-country deviations from cost min-
imization). This ratio is then indexed to the level in 1970. The indexed ratio (vertical axis)
is graphed by year (horizontal axis). Indexing allows time variation to be compared across
countries on a convenient scale.
The top panel of Figure 7 shows the deviations over time for Iraq, Iran and Kuwait. Devia-
tions from cost minimization increase in the 1980s, during the Iran and Iraq war. Subsequently,
deviations decrease for Iran. By contrast, deviations in Iraq spike in the two gulf wars and the
incursion by ISIL. Interesting, the first gulf war also sees a spike in deviation for Kuwait, reflect-
ing the destruction of infrastructure by retreating Iraqi forces. These time-series here illustrate
the influence of war in generating misallocation.
The bottom panel of Figure 7 shows the deviations over time for the USA, China and Russia.
Deviations in the USA are stable until the late 2000s, when unconventional drilling increases
substantially. We speculate that the increase in deviations are suggestive of expectational errors
(or at least a divergence in expectations of profitability within the US oil sector). Russia and
China both show marked declines in divergence from cost-minimization, consistent with their
long-run transition to market based economies.
Last, we examine distortions in quantity space. Table 6 presents the market share of the
20 largest oil-producing countries in 2014, as well as those that our competitive model would
predict with price taking to start on Jan 1 2014 (hence the term static). The measures presented
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here incorporate all distortions, rather than focusing specifically on those that can be attributed
to the exercise of market power by OPEC.
As might be expected, the market share of the Gulf countries increases significantly, from
25.8 percent to 74.4 percent. Saudi Arabia increases its share by 28.1 percentage points, and
Kuwait increases by 12.5 percentage points. This mirrors contemporary commentary casting
these two counties as key players in the OPEC cartel.
All other Gulf countries would increase production, but not to the same extent. Other, non-
Gulf, OPEC members would cut back on production, reducing market share by a cumulative
9.1 percentage points. This is consistent with OPEC not being an efficiently run cartel inter-
nally, and allocating more share to these countries than would be consistent with joint surplus
maximization.
Production by non-OPEC countries would decrease substantially. The large non-OPEC pro-
ducers would decrease their share from 60.7 percent to 21.2 percent, while the rest of the world
would decrease share from 13.6% to 4.4%. In particular, Russia and the U.S. would both see
large share reductions of 9.7 and 11.9 percentage points, respectively.
These quantity changes are significant, physically, economically and, geo-politically. This
underscores the significant extent to which distortions shape world production. It should be
recognized that shifting shares to this extent is unlikely to be technically feasible in one year,
but then neither is it likely that all distortions present in the global oil market will be removed in
one year. Rather, the results in Table 6 give a clear picture of the significance of the cumulative
distortions and the influence of these distortions in shaping the world as we find it.
5.3.3 Alternative Specifications
The baseline model underlying the results reported above incorporates a set of model and
parameter assumptions. These include the following: field extraction in a given year is capped
at 10 percent of the maximal reserve level; reserves are measured using the P50 metric assessed
at a price per barrel of $70; the resource cost of extraction does not include payments made in
the form of taxes or royalties; and fields are available for exploitation after the date of discovery.
In this section, the sensitivity of the baseline results to these assumptions is explored.
Table 7 shows the dynamic counterfactuals for various other alternative specifications for
the timespan 1970-2100 (exhaustion). Column (1) shows results for the baseline specification
and merely reproduces the results reported in Table 5. Columns (2) and (3) show results when
field extraction in a given year is capped at the maximum of 2 or 100 percent of the field’s max-
imal reserve level (respectively) and the maximum extracted proportion of maximal reserves
observed in data for the field in any year.37 All measures of distortions and costs are similar
across specifications (1) through (3).
Column (4) switches attention to the measure of reserves, substituting a P90 reserve mea-
sure for the P50 measure used in the baseline. Recall that P90 is a more restrictive definition
of reserves. The use of this alternative measure makes almost no difference to the results. This
37The actual and counterfactual costs of extraction vary slightly across specification, depending on when final
extraction occurs. This is true for the actual path, in addition to the counterfactual path, since it needs to be projected
out past 2014.
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is because, for many fields and almost all the larger ones, we see a long history of production,
which means that reserve numbers comprise only a component of our measure of recoverable
reserves, and these reserves are reported on fields for which the underlying geology is well
understood. Any remaining differences are further absorbed through the exercise of taking an
NPV. Hence, any differences that occur toward the end of the time period have little impact on
the discounted sums.
Column (5) adds the tax items in Table A.1 to costs. These costs are then interpreted as
the resource costs that are relevant for welfare measures, and the cost measures that deter-
mine the path of extraction in the undistorted, price-taking, counterfactual. This measure sees
a significant jump in the extent of within-OPEC distortion. This occurs because distortionary
taxes within OPEC are higher in the high-cost countries (Saudi Arabia, for instance, extracts
oil payments from Saudi Aramco profits rather than from revenue, and so incurs no distor-
tionary taxation). Hence, when including tax measures in the measure of resource costs, this
exacerbates existing distortions within OPEC. In the rest of the world, there is a slight negative
correlation between tax levels and costs, and so this effect is not present there. Column (6) lets
observed taxes influence the behavior determining the paths of production, but evaluates the
resource cost without including taxes. The impact of taxes on the estimates are explored further
in Section 6.1.1.
Column (7) restricts the sample to include only those fields active in 1970. Column (8) re-
stricts fields to be available in the counterfactual after the first date of observed production,
rather than from the date of discovery. As can be seen, this makes little difference to the upper
and lower bounds on the impact of market power. Together, these simulations provide prelim-
inary evidence that the results are not being driven by the treatment of any start-up costs that
may be present. These results are discussed more thoroughly in Section 6.2, together with a
more detailed discussion of the impact of start-up costs.
6 Modeling alternatives
In this section, we discuss additional factors that may impact the results reported above. In
Section 6.1 we drop the infra-marginal approach to measuring welfare impact adopted in the
rest of the paper (in which other distortions are removed before the impact of market power is
calculated). Instead, we infer the size of wedges resulting from distortions other than market
power. These wedges are then used to infer the marginal impact of market power, in the spirit
of Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) and Buchanan (1969). Following that, we return to the the infra-
marginal measurement model and consider the impact of start-up costs (section 6.2), curvature
in fields’ marginal cost curves (Section 6.3) and heterogeneity in the discount factors of market
actors (Section 6.4).
6.1 The marginal impact of market power
The analysis proceeds in two steps. The first, in Section 6.1.1, examines the impact of market
power conditional on observable taxes. Aside from accounting for the impact of observable
taxes on behavior, it stays close to the marginal approach to measuring welfare impact. The
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second step, in Section 6.1.2, estimates the marginal impact by first inferring the distribution
of wedges in non-OPEC countries and then exploiting the assumption that, in the absence
of OPEC market power, these wedges reflect the wedge distribution that would arise within
OPEC. This lets world outcomes be compared to a counterfactual that models non-market-
power distortions, allowing us to estimate the marginal impact of market power.
6.1.1 Taxes and Royalties: Allowing for interactions with other observed distortions
As documented in Table 2, there are many different taxes that governments levy on the oil
industry. These taxes include royalties, taxes on revenue, income taxes, forms of production-
sharing agreement that act like royalties, and operating expenditure taxes. Depending on the
country, these taxes can generate revenues that are up to double the resource cost of extracting
oil. Some taxes, such as income taxes, are, in principle, non-distortionary — they should not
affect production choices. Other taxes, including royalties, taxes on revenue, taxes on oper-
ating expenditures, and production-sharing agreements, will alter production decisions. The
data contain records of many of these forms of taxation. Given this, we incorporate those tax
elements that are clearly distortionary (listed in Table 4) into costs. These costs are then used
to compute counterfactual paths. However, in evaluating the economic (resource) costs of dif-
ferent allocations, we use only economic costs and not costs inclusive of taxes. That is, we
compute competitive allocations, under different constraints, under the assumption that the
sorting algorithm operates on costs inclusive of observed distortionary taxes.
These results are included in column (6) of Table 7. The results suggest that the presence of
these observed distortionary taxes, if anything, slightly increase the impact of market power in
this market. Since OPEC countries typically have nationalized oil production, they tend not to
raise government revenues through taxes on oil producers.
6.1.2 Wedges: Allowing for interactions with unobserved distortions
While the previous section discussed the effect of observed distortionary taxes on our measure-
ment of the effect of market power, there are still likely other deviations present in the data that
drive a wedge between price and (social) marginal costs. For instance, in the United States,
we frequently observe cheaper fields producing after more expensive fields have been used,
which violates the logic of the sorting algorithm. As in the previous discussion of taxes, we
wish to evaluate the effect of market power in the presence of these unobserved “wedges” on
production choices. That is, we want to derive a measure of the marginal impact of market
power conditional on these distortions.
The first step in doing so is to infer the size of these wedges for the oil reserves in our data.
This is done by computing the wedges required to transform the marginal costs observed in our
data into marginal costs (inclusive of wedges) that are consistent with the order of extraction
actually observed. The idea is that if two fields have marginal costs of $6 and $10 per barrel, but
the $10 field is extracted first, then there must be a wedge of at least $4 imposed on the cheaper
field. Subject to some details in implementation, this observation lets the wedges that apply
to non-OPEC fields be recovered, given that we observe actual marginal costs and the order of
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extraction.38 Wedges are inferred such that the marginal costs inclusive of wedges generate the
observed production path of non-OPEC fields when applied to the sorting algorithm. Given
that production paths can be rationalized by a range of wedges, we select the vector of taxes
that minimizes the sum of the absolute size of wedges. Where the solution is not unique over
this set of vectors, we choose the solution that sets the tax on the median barrel in that interval
equal to zero.
The above approach results in a vector of implicit taxes that apply to barrels that are not
subject to the market power distortions resulting from OPEC. This being said, the timing of
extraction in non-OPEC countries, is clearly dependent on the market power exerted by OPEC,
so the estimation of these wedges cannot be completely divorced from market power.
In implementing this approach on the full dataset some model choices are required to ease
computation and enhance transparency. First, no annual extraction limit is imposed on a field
ex ante. The implicit taxes that are derived absorb this feature at a field-year level. Second, the
time varying component of costs, µ, is common to all fields and is not technology-specific. This
allows the taxes to be derived deterministically since, with this adjustment, the ordering of the
production sequence in perfect competition is independent of µ realizations.
The above process gives a set of wedges for non-OPEC fields (equivalently, reserves or
barrels). Recovery of non-market-power related wedges for OPEC fields is not possible in our
setting since the path of OPEC extraction is a function of the exercise of market power. This
means that OPEC wedges cannot be separately identified.
Hence, the second step in the process is to use the set of wedges recovered from non-OPEC
fields to inform an understanding of the wedges that would be present in OPEC fields in the
absence of OPEC exercising market power. To do this, we sample from the distribution of
wedges inferred on non-OPEC barrels and apply these to OPEC fields to form the marginal
costs that determine the production paths of OPEC fields in the absence of market power.
This sampling process is conducted as follows. The first step, on non-OPEC fields, gives a
distribution of wedges. Each wedge τk in this distribution is mapped to a subset of the barrels
of size qk in a given field (if a field produces across multiple years, the barrels in each year will
have different wedges since the cf ’s are common to all barrels in a field). We sample i.i.d. with
replacement from the distribution of wedges, and apply each wedge τk that is sampled to a
quantity qk of barrels in an OPEC field. This process is continued until all OPEC reserves have
a wedge attached to them. This results in a sampling procedure that applies wedges weighted
by the quantity of oil to which the wedge applies in the non-OPEC wedge distribution. We will
refer to this as the unconditional sampling procedure.
A notable feature of the data is that wedges are strongly negatively correlated with actual
marginal costs. That is, the correlation coefficient between cf and the inferred wedges in the
non-OPEC fields is -0.99.39 To accommodate this, we employ an alternative sample procedure,
in which we require that wedges applied to OPEC reserves be drawn from non-OPEC fields
that have a cf within $5 of the cf of the OPEC field. We will refer to this as sampling conditional
on marginal costs.
38A detailed discussion of the algorithm used to recover wedges is contained in Appendix B.
39Since wedges are constructed to explain why lower-cost fields are not extracted first, it is not surprising that
wedges move precisely in the opposite direction from costs.
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Table 8 shows the results, and columns (1) and (2) reproduce the baseline and 100 percent
extraction limit cases in Table 7 (columns (1) and (3)). These two columns are for comparison
with the results conditional on wedges, and the reported measurements have the same defini-
tion as those reported in Tables 7 and 5.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 8 contain the results derived using the procedure described
above. Column (3) uses the unconditional sampling procedure. The reported actual cost is
the NPV of the resource cost of the actual path of extraction, evaluated using actual resource
costs.40 The counterfactual reported for column (3), denoted C2, takes marginal costs including
wedges, and computes the extraction path of global oil reserves assuming that all actors are
price takers. That is, the sorting algorithm is applied with marginal costs including wedges as
an input, and not further constraints. Note that this is different from that reported for columns
(1) and (2). As in earlier tables, the reported counterfactual there, denoted C1, removes all
sources of distortion and corresponds to a perfectly competitive equilibrium path.
These differences in measurement of the counterfactual results in column (3)’s counterfac-
tual (C2) giving similar total distortions (A−C1 or A−C2) to those in columns (1) and (2). That
said, the difference is not as large as one might expect. This is due, in part, to the unconditional
sampling procedure. This procedure means that OPEC fields do not have the same negative
correlation between cf and the wedge size observed outside OPEC. This results in OPEC have a
much more efficient extraction path, absent market power, than the rest of the world, allowing
large welfare gains to be realized from moving to price-taking behavior.
Given this, column (4) reports results using sampling conditional on marginal costs. As
can be seen, this reduces the impact of removing market power distortion and allows other
distortions to have a greater influence on the counterfactual paths.
For columns (3) and (4), the OPEC distortion is simply the difference between the actual cost
and the counterfactual costs. This is because all distortions unrelated to OPEC are captured by
the imputed wedges imposed on the marginal costs used by firms to compute the extraction
paths. For columns (1) and (2), the definitions of upper and lower bound correspond to those
used in Tables 7 and 5.
Comparing the distortion due to OPEC across columns indicates that the infra-marginal
approach to measurement (columns (1) and (2)), if anything, understates the impact of market
power in this setting. The impact of market power as reported in columns (3) and (4) tends
to be larger, suggesting that, at the margin, market power combines with other distortions to
further amplify the extent of production misallocation, and the associated welfare loss therein.
Thus, a marginal approach to measurement, accounting for the impact of the theory of the
second best, in the spirit of Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), suggests that our baseline estimate of
the impact of market power in the oil market is a conservative estimate of the impact of OPEC
countries shifting to price-taking behavior.
40These differ across specification due to different extraction rate assumptions in columns (1) and (2) and differ-
ences in wedges sampling between (3) and (4). This means that each specification has slightly different extraction
paths post-2014. In keeping with the necessary structure of inferring wedges, paths of extraction are computed tak-
ing costs as cfµt, but to minimize departures from the results in the rest of the paper, resource costs are evaluated
using cost as measured by cfµst
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6.2 Start-up Costs
Start-up costs, expenditures linked to “switching the field on” and, therefore, sunk in or before
the first year of operation, can be an issue in two parts of the analysis. First, they may alter
the counterfactual production path. That is, a high start-up cost, low marginal cost, field may
delay its initial production date in a competitive equilibrium relative to that predicted in the
baseline model. Second, these fixed costs are welfare-relevant and, to the extent to which they
are not being counted in the measurement, they may offset the otherwise conservative nature
of the calculations executed using the baseline model.
As a preliminary measure, we examine the proportion of production between 1970 and
2014 that is provided by fields that were producing in 1970. For these fields, all start-up costs
will already be sunk. These fields collectively are responsible for 58 percent of total production
between 1970 and 2014, over 45 percent of total costs. Hence, for a large proportion of the fields
and costs, the presence and magnitude of any start-up cost is irrelevant.
Figure 8 investigates the size of these fixed costs for fields that started production after 1970,
by computing, within a field, cumulative costs and cumulative production. The magnitude of
these start-ups costs can be identified from the proportion of expenditures incurred prior to the
start of production. We report aggregates, weighting by field-level production, and breaking
out fields by onshore, offshore shelf, offshore deepwater, and shale/oil sands. For a conven-
tional onshore field, just over 20 percent of costs are incurred before the first barrel is produced,
while for an offshore deepwater field, this number is closer to 30 percent. By contrast, shale has
much smaller start-up costs (even if this relationship is far noisier given the more limited num-
ber of shale fields).41
Given the presence of start-up costs, we evaluate their impact on our results by running
two alternate simulations. In the first, we use only fields active in 1970, which have already
sunk any start-up costs. In the second, we restrict the first year of production of fields to occur
in or after the first year that we observe production in the data (as opposed to discovery, as in
the baseline specification). This allows the process governing the imposition of start-up costs
to be held constant between the actual path and any counterfactual. Hence, start-up costs can
be canceled.
Results from these simulations are found in columns (7) (only fields active in 1970) and (8)
(restricting start year) of Table 7. In Column 7, actual costs are only 1465, rather than 2499 in
Column 1. This is because we also restrict demand to account only for consumption from pre-
1970. We find a 30 percent difference between the actual and competitive counterfactual costs,
which is identical to the baseline results in Column 1. Moreover, the upper and lower bounds
on the contribution of OPEC to this gap are 40 and 27 percent, respectively, larger than the 22
and 14 percent in the baseline of column 1.
Likewise, in Column 8, the actual costs are similar to the baseline, but the counterfactual
costs are higher at 1,797 billion, rather than 1,756 billion, since we have prohibited fields from
41In Figure 8, constant marginal costs and no start-up costs would imply that cumulative costs lie on the 45-degree
line. In the presence of start-up costs, the line is rotated upwards, but should remain linear thereafter. In Figure 8
the right tail of the cost distribution is slightly convex, suggesting that there are some increasing marginal costs at
the end of a field’s life. As is discussed in Section 6.3, this is due to rising industry-wide input costs at the end of
our sample period.
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starting production before the first year we see them produce in the data. Again, the productive
inefficiency due to OPEC is also larger, with upper and lower bounds of 188 and 125 billion,
respectively, versus 163 and 105 billion in column 1 (baseline).
There are larger effects when we focus attention on fields producing in 1970 or restrict coun-
terfactual production paths to start off new fields no sooner than their first year of production
in the data, since most of the low-cost fields in OPEC are the super-giant fields in the Persian
Gulf, such as Ghawar or Burgan, and these fields have been in operation since the 1950s and
1960s. Therefore, the reallocation of production from non-OPEC fields to super-giant fields in
the Persian Gulf is unhindered by start-up costs since these fields were already producing in
1970.
To explain the similarity between these alternative simulations and the baseline results, we
examine the correlation between start-up costs and our estimates of marginal costs. Fields with
high start-up costs and low marginal costs are problematic for the way competitive equilib-
rium is modeled. These fields may delay activation relative to what is predicted by the sorting
algorithm we employ.
To investigate the correlation between start-up and marginal costs, we measure start-up
costs as the sum of expenditures in years prior to and including the first year of production,
and compute the correlation between these start-up costs and unit costs cft. The resulting
correlation coefficient is 0.47, while the Spearman rank correlation, on the same sample, is
0.86. This suggests a strong positive relationship between a field’s initial start-up cost and
subsequent total cost of production, so start-up costs would not, on average, reverse the order
of extraction from the sorting algorithm on marginal costs.
6.3 Marginal cost curvature
Recall that we use the following specification for costs (in equation 13):
cft = cfµst exp (ft).
This specification assumes constant marginal costs, conditional on the realization of µst. If costs
have curvature, this will be absorbed into the ft, and this ft will be correlated with the stage
of the field in its life cycle (the proportion of recoverable reserves that have been extracted).
To assess the impact of any field-level curvature that may be present, it is useful to keep in
mind two features of our approach. First, we consider the entire global market for crude oil,
and aggregate production across many thousands of oil fields and hundreds of thousands of
individual wells, which implies that within-field curvature is likely to be less important to the
extent that it merely smooths the transitions in an aggregate supply curve that resembles a step
function. Second, we already impose a form of curvature by limiting the speed of extraction in
a given year.
Nonetheless, we present two pieces of evidence to inform an evaluation of the likely impact
of curvature on the results. First, in Figure 9, we present the observed marginal cost schedule
for the largest oil field in our data, Ghawar Uthmaniyah in Saudi Arabia, with cumulative
production on the horizontal axis and costs on the vertical axis. We also plot the predicted
marginal cost derived from estimating the cost specification in equation 13.
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The wedge between the two curves indicates the extent to which the cost specification,
which combines constant marginal cost with technology-year specific cost shocks, is violated.
Reserves are shown with a vertical line. This figure indicates that predicted and actual marginal
costs are very close to each other and that the main source of variation in the observed costs
is due to the cyclicality in input prices that is correlated with oil prices, most likely reflecting
input market tightness during periods of high prices. This source of cost variation is picked up
by the µst in the cost specification, and the technology s subscript allows the share of energy
used in production (e.g., fuel costs) to vary across technology types.
Second, in Figure 10 presents the relationship between the error term ft and cumulative
output over reserves, for all onshore fields in the Gulf states, the U.S. and Russia, as well as for
Norway’s offshore fields. Figure 10 shows that ft is unrelated to the the proportion of recov-
erable reserves that have been extracted. In particular, there is no obvious pattern as reserves
near depletion. For Norwegian offshore production, an initial high marginal cost of production
is observed, reflecting the start-up costs discussed in the previous section, but following these
early periods, ft is centered around zero.
Together, Figures 9 and 10 indicate that any violations away from constant marginal costs
are not substantial, and this visual intuition is confirmed by regression analysis on the entire
sample of fields. Moreover, the presence of the technology-year fixed effects absorbs most of
the observed variation in the levels of marginal cost curves.
6.4 Discount factors
A maintained assumption in the analysis presented in this paper is that all actors in the mar-
ket have the same discount factor (δ), and, indeed, any change in a common discount factor
does not alter the ordering of production in a price-taking equilibrium. Many features of the
framework explored here would be infeasible were this feature to be arbitrarily relaxed. For
instance, the wedges explored in Section 6.1 could be substantially rationalized by different
discount factors existing across different firms and regimes.
That said, the model accommodates some flexibility in discount rates with no change to the
results. In particular, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 remain valid if fields with lower costs have
a lower discount factor (value the future less) – that is if ∂δ∂c > 0. If this is true, then the sorting
algorithm is preserved without alteration.
Given this, and that many of the lower-cost reserves in the world are located in arguably
less stable geographic regions, it may be that, even if the common discount factor assumption is
unreasonable, the sorting algorithm still provides a useful framework through which to model
the price-taking counterfactual. In such a setting, all that would be required is that the discount




This paper demonstrates an alternative framework for understanding and measuring the ex-
tent of misallocation, and applies this approach to the global oil industry. We focus on mea-
suring productive inefficiency, which while closely linked to standard metrics in the existing
literature on misallocation, allows new data to be brought to to bear on misallocation in a way
that has a clear welfare interpretation in partial equilibrium. We also show how to extend this
approach to decompose the extent of misallocation into different components, in ways that re-
spect the interaction between different distortions as implied by the theory of the second-best.
The framework introduced in this paper is quite general and can be applied studying mis-
allocation in other contexts. The sorting algorithm in this paper addresses the problem of
inter-temporal misallocation, and the approach of providing lower bounds to misallocation
by looking at competitive solutions constrained to limit production, within and between coun-
tries, could be used to provide more conservative, and perhaps also more plausible, estimates
of economic distortions. In industries in which production dynamics are not present, but for
which similar, detailed production and cost data exist, the static analog of this approach is
similarly feasible.
However, many other environments will imply the cost of production to be linked over
time; these includes but are not limited to learning by doing, adjustment cost of factors of
production, time to build, technology adoption, and research and development. While in this
paper, the approach is tailored to the specifics of the oil market, it is more general and applies
whenever producer-level costs of production is observed and an indication of which market
participants are, potentially, believed to execute market power.
Applying this methodology to the global oil industry indicates substantial productive inef-
ficiency. An economically significant proportion of this is due to market power – between 105
and 163 billion 2014 USD, or 14 and 21 percent of the total inefficiency, depending on the cartel
model applied. The results from this study indicate that market power can affect aggregate out-
comes – here, the total cost of production in the world oil market (and, hence, the price of oil) –
which, in turn, affect a host of economic decisions and macroeconomic aggregates. Harberger
(1954), famously, estimated the welfare losses due to monopoly for the entire US economy in
1921 at two billion dollars in today’s currency.
An observation, arising from this paper and suggestive of productive future research, is
that monopoly may have welfare effects that are several orders of magnitude larger than that
implied by the Harberger style of analysis.
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Appendix
A Definitions of cost components
Table A.1: Definitions of cost components
Exploration Capital Expenditures: Costs incurred to find and prove hydrocarbons: seismic, wildcat
and appraisal wells, and general engineering costs.
Well Capital Expenditures Capitalized costs related to well construction, including drilling
costs, rig lease, well completion, well stimulation, steel costs and
materials.
Facility Capital Expenditures Costs to develop, install, maintain and modify surface installa-
tions and infrastructure.
Abandonment Cost Costs for decommissioning a field.
Production Operating Expenditures Operational expenses directly related to the production activity.
The category includes materials, tools, maintenance, equipment
lease costs and operation-related salaries. Depreciation and other
non-cash items are not included.
Transportation Operating Expenditures Represents the costs of bringing the oil and gas from the pro-
duction site/processing plant to the pricing point (only upstream
transportation). The category includes transport fees and blend-
ing costs.
SGA Operating Expenditures Operating expenses not directly associated with field operations.
The category includes administrative staff costs, office leases, re-
lated benefits (stocks and stock option plans) and professional
expenses (legal, consulting, insurance). Only exploration and
production-related SG&A are included.
Taxes Operating Expenditure Local US taxes that are directly related to production. The cat-
egory includes ad valorem taxes (county-based) and severance
taxes (state-based).
Royalties The sum of all gross taxes, including royalties and oil and export
duties.
Government Profit Oil The production-sharing agreement equivalent to petroleum
taxes, but paid in kind (that is, the government contracts with
a company to develop and operate the field, but retains rights to
a proportion of the production). Government Profit Oil reduces
the company’s entitlement production and is treated as a royalty
effect in company reports.
Source: Rystad U-Cube External Use Documentation.
B Constructing implicit wedges
To construct the implicit wedges on non-OPEC fields that account for the deviations in production de-
cisions away from those consistent with perfect competition, we use the following procedure.
A wide range of implicit wedges could rationalize the observed production path for non-OPEC
fields. To settle on a specific wedge vector, we assume that implicit wedges are constant over time and
are attached to specific barrels. That is, different barrels from the same field may have different wedges
associated with them. This allows for production from a field to be spread over many years, whereas in
perfect competition, it may be compressed. Given this, we search for a vector of wedges that minimizes
the absolute value of wedge payments. That is, each element of the vector is a wedge associated with
a specific barrel of crude. We search for a vector that minimizes the sum of the absolute value of the
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Table B.1: Small-scale example of calculating implied wedges
Barrel cf Adj. cost Implied wedge Adj. cost Final implied wedge
(stage 1) (stage 1) (stage 2) (stage 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A 7 7 0 7 0
B 13 13 0 10 -3
C 6 14 8 11 5
D 12 15 3 12 0
elements of this vector.42
The solution to this minimization problem is found by using a two-step algorithm. In the first step,
wedges are added to the costs of production (cf ’s) for each barrel until the sequence of production
predicted by the sorting algorithm matches that in the observed data for non-OPEC barrels. In the
second step, these wedges from the first step are reduced, at times resulting in negative wedges, until
a minimum is found. This second step finds a minimizing wedge vector by leveraging the fact that the
first step creates a wedge vector that puts wedges on all barrels that are weakly too high. Thus, the
direction in which to search for a minimizing vector is known.
The logic of the algorithm implementation is best illustrated via the example in Table B.1, which
shows four barrels of oil, labeled A, B, C and D, which are extracted in that order. The observed unit
cost of each barrel is shown in column 2. In columns 3 and 4, the first-stage calculations are shown,
in which wedges (column 4) are added, as necessary, to make the adjusted costs (column 3) have the
same ordering as production. Note that the sum of the absolute values of these (stage 2) wedges is
8 + 3 = 11. Columns 5 and 6 show the stage 2 calculations. The algorithm starts with the final unit
of production (D) and looks to see if the wedge on it can be reduced without violating the ordering
(imposing a minimum increment of 1). In this case, it cannot, as the adjusted cost of D is 15 (column
2), while C has an adjusted cost of 14. Next, the set {D,C} is considered: can the wedges on both these
barrels be reduced by a common amount without violating ordering? Again, the answer is no, given the
minimum increment of 1. Now the set {D,C,B} is considered. Here, the stage 1 implied wedge can be
reduced by up to 5 on each of {D,C,B} without violating ordering. However, the sum of the absolute
values of wedge payments in this interval is minimized when the reduction is equal to 3 or, equivalently,
when the median wedge in this interval is equal to zero.43 Note that the sum of the absolute values of
these (stage 1) wedges is 3+5 = 8. The algorithm implemented to find the implied wedges for all barrels
in the dataset is a large-scale version of that used to solve this example.
In implementing this approach on the full dataset some model choices are required to ease compu-
tation and enhance transparency. First, no annual extraction limit is imposed on a field ex ante. The
implicit wedges that are derived absorb this feature at a field-year level. Second, µ is common to all
fields and is not technology-specific. This allows the wedges to be derived deterministically since, with
this adjustment, the ordering of the production sequence in perfect competition is independent of µ





µt exp (εft), (16)
where τf˜ is the wedge to be recovered. We also add the notation f˜ , indicating the set of barrels extracted
42The uniqueness of this wedge vector is not guaranteed. Where the solution is not unique over some interval of
barrels, we choose the solution that sets the wedge on the median barrel in that interval equal to zero.
43Non-uniqueness of a minimizing wedge vector arises when there are an even number of elements in a set that
can be adjusted like that demonstrated here. In that instance, we choose the vector created when the median is set
equal to zero.
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from a specific field-year combination of field f in the data. This allows fields to experience wedges that
split their production over multiple years, in a parsimonious way.
The approach above results in a vector of implicit wedges that apply to barrels that are not subject
to the market power distortions resulting from OPEC. In the absence of OPEC exercising market power,
it is likely that similar distortions would still impact OPEC production. To this end, we sample from the
distribution of implicit wedges that distort non-OPEC production to construct a counterfactual produc-
tion path for OPEC. Together with the implicit wedges added to the costs of production for non-OPEC
countries, this allows us to assess the marginal distortion imposed by OPEC’s exercise of market power
and compare it to the infra-marginal measure discussed in the rest of the paper.
The sampling procedure is conducted as follows. Wedges are sampled with replacement from the
set of all inferred wedges. Each wedge is given equal weight in the sampling. Each wedge τf˜ is linked
to a quantity qf˜ of barrels extracted, in the data, in the same year from the same field. A sampled wedge
is applied to an OPEC field reserves level, in the amount of the qf˜ associated with it. Another wedge is
then sampled and applied to that remaining OPEC field reserves, until all OPEC reserves are covered
by a sampled wedge. Note that, through applying the wedge to reserves according to its associated qf˜ ,
this implicitly means that wedges associated with larger fields get larger weighting. This creates a set of
counterfactual wedges for OPEC fields.
In running counterfactuals, the costs determining paths are formed using these sampled wedges
for OPEC, and the (field-specific) inferred wedges, τf˜ , for each field outside OPEC. Resource costs are
computed using the standard resource cost measure used elsewhere in the paper (not including any
taxes or inferred wedges).
38
Tables and Figures



































Notes: The vertical axis on the left is in dollars and corresponds to the annual average oil price, which is indicated
by the black line. This price series is deflated with the US GDP deflator (base year 2009). The OPEC market share in
each year is indicated by the dashed black line. The vertical axis on the right indicates the level of the market share.
Countries are included in OPEC in all years if they had ever had active membership between 1970 and 2014.
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Notes: Each panel plots the dispersion of the costs of production (by barrel) in a country, and the price of oil.
The vertical axis is $/barrel, from 0 to 100 in increments of 10. The horizontal axis is in years, from 1970 to 2014.
Costs are indicated by the bars and circles. The (grey and black) bar indicates the range of costs within the 1st and
99th percentiles of production. That is, the cheapest, and most expensive, 1% of barrels produced in the year are
excluded. The black portion of the bar indicates the 5th to 95th percentiles range. Circles indicate the maximum
cost per barrel incurred in a year. Where a cost exceeds $100 per barrel, it is not shown (the vertical axis is truncated
at 100) – this accounts for many of the maxima not being visible, for instance. The oil price is indicated by the black
line. All series have been deflated with the US GDP deflator (base year 2009). All costs are measured according to
the baseline specification
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Notes: The notes for Figure 3 also apply to this figure. The Norwegian panel reflects little meaningful production
prior to 1978.
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year
OPEC Share -- Actual
OPEC Share -- Counterfactual
OPEC Share - Counterfactual presents the share of production accounted for by OPEC.
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Note: Static distortions for each year are presented in 2014 dollars (left vertical axis), with the total height
of each bar representing the difference between the actual cost of production and the optimal cost of
production (the total distortion). Each bar is decomposed into the following distortions (from bottom to
top): Within-country (non-OPEC); Within-country (OPEC); Across country (Within non-OPEC); Across-
country (within OPEC, in grey); Between-OPEC and non-OPEC (in black). Definitions of distortions
decompositions mirror those in Table 5, although only applying to the individual year of interest. The
oil price is shown using the black line dollars corresponding to the right vertical axis.
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Figure 7: Within-Country deviations from cost-minimizing production:
Selected countries (1970-2014)






































































Notes: In panel (a), Iraq is heavy bold, Iran is light bold line and Kuwait is the dashed line. In panel (b), USA is heavy
bold, China is light bold line and Russia is the dashed line. The ratio of total observed cost and cost-minimizing
(optimal) cost, taking the actual production up that year as an initial condition (as per static distortion calculations)
and holding country production fixed, is computed for each year (i.e., annual within-country deviations from cost
minimization). This ratio is indexed to the level in 1970. The indexed ratio (vertical axis) is graphed by year
(horizontal axis). The ratio in 1970 (i.e. the base year) for Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, USA, China, and Russia is 1.385, 1.563,
1.037, 1.401, 1.956 and 1.742 respectively. 44
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Cumulative Production
Shale, Oil Sands
Notes: Cumulative Production is measured as cumulative production for a field in year t divided by the total
production observed over a fields lifespan. Cumulative Costs are defined likewise for costs. Conventional Oil is
72% of production; Offshore Shelf is 21%; Offshore Deepwater is 6%; Shale is 1%. Only fields that start producing
after 1970 are used for this figure.
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Notes: Observed and predicted marginal cost, using the cost specification in equation 13, is plotted
against cumulative production. The vertical line indicates the proven reserves, and we insert the pro-
duction year 2008, the year with the highest oil price in the sample period 1970-2014.
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Notes The residuals from the cost specification in equation 13 are plotted against the ratio of
cumulative output-to-reserves, and weighted by the production of a field in total (country-
level) production. The fields are top-coded at 100 USD/bbl, and we plot the residuals in the
range of [-100, 100] and consider only fields with reserves that are equal to or higher than total
recorded production over the observed life cycle of a field.
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Table 1: Largest crude producers, % of global production 1970-2014
OPEC Non-OPEC
Saudi Arabia 11.8% United States 14.4%
Iran 5.4% Russia 13.0%
Venezuela 3.8% China 4.1%
UAE 3.1% Mexico 3.7%
Nigeria 2.8% Canada 3.3%
Iraq 2.7% UK 2.4%
Kuwait 2.6% Norway 2.4%
Notes: Global production from 1970-2014 was 1,156
billion barrels. Collectively, these 14 countries account
for 85.4% of global production.
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Table 2: Summary statistics, by field-year
Variable mean median 5% 95%
Field-year characteristics:
Production (mB/year) 3.43 0.22 0.00 10.92
Reserves (mB) 99.49 3.71 0.03 239.78
Discovery Year 1965 1967 1911 1999
Startup Year 1971 1974 1916 2005
Off-shore 0.19
Costs: ($m)
Exploration Capital Expenditures 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.41
Well Capital Expenditures 9.10 0.49 0.00 35.32
Facility Capital Expenditures 5.14 0.21 0.00 16.85
Production Operating Expenditures 10.41 0.46 0.00 38.47
Transportation Operating Expenditures 2.27 0.13 0.00 7.01
SGA Operating Expenditures 2.65 0.22 0.00 8.85
Taxes Operating Expenditures 1.41 0.00 0.00 1.09
Royalties 18.19 0.40 0.00 45.36
Government Profit Oil 15.59 0.00 0.00 21.00
Notes: Only fields with active production during 1970-2014 are included. There are 66,920
fields in the Rystad data. 13,248 of these fields have active production. Reserves data ex-
ists for 13,298 fields. As a result, in Section 5, 11,457 fields are used. All numbers are in
$US deflated by the US GDP deflator for 2009. mB indicates million barrels. The unit of
observation is the field-year.
Table 3: Reserves and production, 2014
Reserves Share of world reserves Reserves/(Annual production)
(mB) (%) (%)
Non-OPEC 218,054 50 10
Russia 46,134 11 12
Canada 36,622 8 43
United States 31,735 7 7
Norway 6,962 2 10
OPEC 220,561 50 19
Saudi Arabia 74,194 17 18
Venezuela 17,523 4 19
Kuwait 15,723 4 16
Nigeria 7,952 2 10
Data are for 2014. Total reserves for the world in 2014 were 438 billion barrels. The ratio of
reserves-to-production was 14. OPEC countries are listed in Section 2.2. Countries are included in
OPEC in all years if they had ever had active membership between 1970 and 2014. Reserves are
reported using P50 measures at a world price of $70 per barrel.
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Table 4: Unit costs across the global oil industry (1970-2014)
1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2014
Number of active fields 4,766 7,088 9,760 12,085
Mean oil price 20 40 21 59
Mean global production (mB/year) 20,861 21,489 23,984 26,298
OPEC 9,979 7,289 9,606 11,249
Mean global reserves (mB) 737,928 728,532 661,815 517,559
OPEC 392,912 365,891 328,914 254,730
Unit costs (Baseline specification):
95th percentile Saudi Arabia 5.8 13.6 4.4 10.4
Median Saudi Arabia 2.3 5.6 2.3 5.4
95th percentile OPEC 6.7 18.6 7.6 20.1
Median OPEC 2.4 5.9 2.8 6.1
95th percentile non-OPEC 6.7 15.6 9.2 28.2
Median non-OPEC 3.6 7.0 4.1 9.7
Unit costs (including taxes and royalty payments):
95th percentile Saudi Arabia 5.8 13.6 4.4 10.4
Median Saudi Arabia 2.3 5.6 2.3 5.4
95th percentile OPEC 30.2 53.6 21.1 79.1
Median OPEC 2.8 13.6 6.5 12.0
95th percentile non-OPEC 26.3 40.1 20.3 75.3
Median non-OPEC 9.1 14.8 9.1 24.0
Notes: The unit cost is computed as per Section 4.1 and top-coded at $100. The unit of observation
for unit cost is the barrel. Percentiles and medians are calculated at the barrel level. All prices
and costs are deflated with the US GDP deflator (base year 2009). Reserves are reported using P50
measures at a world price of $70 per barrel. OPEC countries are listed in Section 2.2. Countries are
included OPEC in all years if they had ever had active membership between 1970 and 2014. Only
fields active between 1970 and 2014 are included.
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Table 5: Dynamic counterfactual results
(NPV of costs in billions of 2014 dollars)
Timespan
1970-2014 1970-2100
Actual (A) 2184 (125) 2499 (130)
Counterfactual (C) 1268 (76) 1756 (79)
Total distortion (A - C) 916 (124) 744 (112)
Decomposition of total distortion
Within country (non-OPEC) 329 (80) 284 (41)
Within country (OPEC) 192 (46) 157 (72)
Across country (within non-OPEC) 163 (18) 139 (17)
Across country (within OPEC) (X) 85 (22) 58 (21)
Between OPEC and non-OPEC (Y) 148 (29) 105 (25)
Production distortion due to OPEC market power
Upper bound (X+Y) 233 (42) 163 (38)
Lower bound (Y only) 148 (29) 105 (25)
Notes: The NPV of costs from 1970 to 2014, and to 2100 (exhaustion of all fields), are reported in
billions of 2014 dollars (assuming a 5 percent discount rate). Results are for the baseline specifi-
cation: a field extraction rate of 10 percent of reserves is imposed in the counterfactual: the p50
measures of reserves are used where needed, and a demand growth rate of 1.3 percent per year
after 2014 is assumed. The Actual path is that observed in the data. The Counterfactual path
is that computed using the unconstrained sorting algorithm. The within-country (non-OPEC)
decomposition takes the path from the sorting algorithm in which all non-OPEC countries are
constrained to produce their actual production. OPEC fields produce as in the data. The re-
ported number is A - [the NPV of the costs of this path] = D1. The within-country (OPEC)
decomposition is the mirror of this for OPEC countries ( = D2). The across-country (within
non-OPEC) decomposition takes the path from the sorting algorithm in which non-OPEC pro-
duction is constrained to match the observed amount. OPEC fields produce as in the data. The
reported number is A - D1 - [the NPV of the costs of this path] = E1. The across-country (within
OPEC) decomposition is the mirror of this for OPEC countries ( = E2). The Between OPEC
and non-OPEC decomposition takes the path from the unconstrained sorting algorithm. The
reported number is A - D1 - D2 - E1 - E2 - C = F1. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
using 50 bootstrap replications.
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Table 6: Static counterfactual for 2014: Top 20 producers
Country Actual output share Counterfactual output share ∆ Share
Persian Gulf OPEC 0.258 0.744 0.486
Iran 0.057 0.091 0.034
Iraq 0.029 0.069 0.040
Kuwait 0.030 0.155 0.125
Qatar 0.009 0.015 0.006
Saudi Arabia 0.133 0.414 0.281
United Arab Emirates 0.031 0.075 0.044
Other OPEC 0.135 0.044 -0.091
Algeria 0.021 0.015 -0.006
Indonesia 0.020 0.002 -0.018
Libya 0.025 0.012 -0.013
Nigeria 0.028 0.006 -0.022
Venezuela 0.041 0.009 -0.032
Non-OPEC 0.607 0.212 -0.395
Brazil 0.014 0.001 -0.013
Canada 0.023 0.006 -0.017
China 0.045 0.002 -0.043
Kazakhstan 0.010 0.000 -0.01
Mexico 0.023 0.013 -0.01
Norway 0.027 0.009 -0.018
Russia 0.144 0.047 -0.097
United Kingdom 0.022 0.001 -0.021
United States 0.132 0.013 -0.119
Rest of the World 0.136 0.044 -0.092
Note: Reported results are for the top 20 producers between 1970 and 2014. Initial conditions
are the state of the global market at the end of 2013. Application of the sorting algorithm gives
counterfactual production for 2014. In every other respect, the baseline specification is used: a
field extraction rate of 10 percent of reserves is imposed in the counterfactual; the p50 measures
of reserves are used where needed; and a demand growth rate of 1.3 percent per year after 2014
is assumed.
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Table 7: Dynamic counterfactual results, alternate specifications
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Actual (A) 2499 2467 2507 2499 4484 2474 1465 2500
Counterfactual (C) 1756 1804 1713 1757 2839 1703 1021 1797
Total distortion (A - C) 744 664 793 742 1645 771 444 703
Proportion: (A - C)/A 0.298 0.269 0.316 0.297 0.367 0.312 0.303 0.281
Distortion due to OPEC
Upper bound (X+Y) 163 148 150 161 747 196 179 188
Lower bound (Y only) 105 89 95 104 225 99 120 125
Proportion: (X+Y)/(A-C) 0.219 0.224 0.189 0.218 0.454 0.255 0.404 0.268
Proportion: Y/(A-C) 0.142 0.134 0.120 0.140 0.137 0.128 0.271 0.178
Notes: Select results for Table 5 are reported for different model and parameter specifications. The units
are billions of 2014 dollars or proportions. Results correspond to the 1970-2100 (exhaustion) timespan.
Specifications are: (1) the baseline specification; (2) baseline, but with the limit on the proportion of
reserves extractable in a given year changed to max{xf , 2%}; (3) baseline, but with a no limit on the
proportion of reserves extractable in a given year; (4) baseline, but using a P90 reserve measure; (5)
baseline, adding the distortionary tax items in Table A.1 to costs; (6) has behavior computed with the
competitive solution with wedge inclusive costs, but the costs of a particular allocation are evaluated
with respect to economic costs only; (7) baseline, but restricting the sample to include only fields in
active production in 1970; (8) baseline, but constraining fields to be usable in and after the first year of
observed production, rather than discovery.
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Table 8: Dynamic counterfactual results, conditional on inferred wedges
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Actual (A) 2498 2492 2670 2596
Counterfactual (C1) 1757 1757 - -
Counterfactual (C2) - - 1825 2452
Total distortion (A - C1) 741 735 - -
Second-Best distortion (A - C2) - - 845 144
Distortion due to OPEC - - 845 144
Upper bound 174 158 - -
Lower bound 117 100 - -
Notes: The units are billions of 2014 dollars. Results correspond
to the 1970-2100 (exhaustion) timespan. Specifications are: (1) the
baseline specification; (2) baseline, but with no limit on the propor-
tion of reserves extractable in a given year; (3) average over 20 iter-
ations of a counterfactual computed conditional on inferred wedges
for non-OPEC field-years, and wedges for OPEC reserves sampled
(with replacement) i.i.d from all non-OPEC inferred wedges; (4) av-
erage over 20 iterations of a counterfactual computed conditional on
inferred wedges for non-OPEC field-years, and wedges for OPEC re-
serves sampled (with replacement) i.i.d from all non-OPEC inferred
wedges inferred for fields with cf within $5 of the OPEC field’s cf .)
The actual costs differ across specification due to different extraction
rate assumptions in columns (1) and (2) and differences in wedges
sampling between (3) and (4). This means that each specification has
slightly different extraction paths post-2014. In keeping with the nec-
essary structure of inferring wedges, all paths of extraction are com-
puted taking costs as cfµt, but to minimize departures from the re-
sults in the rest of the paper, resource costs (in each specification) are
evaluated using cost as measured by cfµst.
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